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Abstract 
This paper empirically investigates the relationship between voluntary environmental 
disclosure and firm value.  The analysis is based on a sample consisting of Nordic listed 
firms disclosing environmental information to the Carbon Disclosure Project in 2007 -2011. 
We investigate the impact of disclosure on firm value from both an accounting and a market 
perspective. We provide evidence of a significant, positive association between the level of 
voluntary environmental disclosure and Tobin’s Q. Furthermore, we find that firms with 
improved disclosure from one year to the next experience abnormal excess return.  Firms 
with stable or aggravated disclosure do not yield the same result. This implies that voluntary 
environmental disclosure is value-relevant for stakeholders, and has a positive impact on 
firm value. 
 
Keywords: Carbon Disclosure Project, Voluntary Environmental Disclosure, Firm Value, 
Stock Returns, Tobin’s Q, Fama/French Benchmark Factors 
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1. Introduction 
The Nobel Peace Prize winner and former U.S. Vice President, Al Gore, claims that 
“integrating issues such as climate change into investment analysis is simply common 
sense”. He is a leading advocate for sustainable capitalism; sustainable long-term value 
maximization through integrating environmental, social and governance issues into 
investment decisions (Generation Investment Management 2012). Al Gore calls it common 
sense, but is it so for all rational, wealth-maximizing investors? Does the management 
decision on whether to communicate environmental performance or not have an impact on 
the valuation of the firm?  
In this paper we investigate the effects of voluntary environmental disclosure on the value of 
Nordic listed firms. Blowfield and Murray (2011) define corporate social reporting as 
accounting for non-financial aspects of a firm’s performance, and extending the firm’s 
accountability to a wide range of stakeholders within the society. Corporate social 
accounting consists of both environmental and social disclosure, and is a way for 
stakeholders to assess whether firm lives up to value expectations (Pruzan 2009). Non-
financial disclosure allows investors to evaluate firms on ethical dimensions, compare 
performance and track development.  
While third party organizations, like MSCI and Oecom, analyze and rank firms based on 
their social and environmental performance, it has become increasingly common for firms to 
initiate voluntary communication of their corporate social responsibility. According to the 
KPMG International Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting 2011, there is an 
increased willingness to report on corporate social issues amongst the largest companies 
across the globe. The emphasis on “softer” key performance indicators has increased, both as 
a result of government regulations and as a consequence of transformations in firm values.  
The financial consequences of voluntary environmental disclosure are of potential interest 
for investors, firms and governments. For profit-maximizing investors, the impact of 
environmental disclosure is of value in investment analysis and in the decision between 
different investment strategies. Over the past years, there are indications of a shift in investor 
preferences. Sustainable capitalism, or social responsible investments, has gained 
momentum. The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) publishes Nordic reports on behalf of 
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signatory investors. Since the first publication in 2007, the number of signatory investors has 
increased from 315 with assets of US$41 trillion to 551 with assets of US$71 trillion 
(Carbon Disclosure Project 2007; 2011). Disclosure of social and environmental issues is an 
important factor when evaluating the sustainability of investment opportunities, and 
disclosure might affect the capital allocation of social responsible investors. 
The financial effects of voluntary environmental disclosure are of interest to firms and 
managers in their strategic decision-making. Identifying the activities that affect the 
environmental performance of a firm is often costly, and firms with high environmental 
accounting have high corresponding disclosure costs. Disclosure can be an instrument in a 
differentiation strategy, aiming to develop a reputation of high environmental consciousness. 
The documentation of potential gains from voluntary environmental disclosure is value 
relevant to firms in their cost-benefit analyses, since firms will choose to disclose 
information until the marginal disclosure costs equals the marginal disclosure benefits 
(Orlitzky and Whelan 2007).  
The effect of disclosure might affect government decisions. In 2010, The Norwegian 
Ministry of Finance presented a hearing proposal suggesting to implement requirements of 
social accounting for firms legally bound to maintain accounting records. Sweden and 
Denmark have already implemented similar regulations (KPMG 2011). If the potential 
benefit from environmental disclosure is greater than the subsequent costs, firms have an 
incentive to disclose environmental information voluntarily. Based on this incentive line of 
thought, one could argue that a documentation of financial benefits would lead to the need 
for less extensive government regulations on social accounting.  
In our study, we examine the value effect of voluntary environmental disclosure on Nordic 
listed firms. These countries are examples of markets where there has been a striking rise in 
corporate social reporting the recent years (KPMG 2011). We restrict our focus to voluntary 
environmental disclosure, mainly because of limitations in available data on corporate social 
reporting. We base our measure of environmental disclosure on the carbon disclosure score 
given to firms reporting to the Carbon Disclosure Project
1
. This organization provides a 
                                                 
1 Alternatively, we considered analysing corporate social reporting based on data from the Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI). This would have allowed us to analyse corporate social reporting as a whole, but the data material is less extensive. 
In order to ensure the quality of our analysis, we choose to look at only environmental disclosure. 
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global standard for measurement and disclosure of information on climate change, and holds 
the largest collection of self-reported climate change data in the world (Carbon Disclosure 
Project, 2012). 
To our knowledge, we are the first to investigate this topic in the Nordic capital markets. We 
use performance measures as proxies for firm value, and focus primarily on Tobin’s Q and 
stock returns. Previous literature on the subject use other measures for firm value, like cost 
of capital or free cash flow (Plumlee et al. 2010; Clarkson et al. 2010; Dhaliwal et al. 2011). 
Our paper contributes to the area of research by looking at a different market and applying 
other firm value measures than earlier studies.  
We look at the effects of different disclosure characteristics to analyze which aspects of 
voluntary environmental disclosure are relevant for valuation purposes. We do a preliminary 
test of the entire Nordic population to examine whether firms that initiate voluntary 
environmental disclosure experience higher firm value that the non-disclosing firms. We find 
a positive association between disclosure initiative and Tobin’s Q, but due to endogeneity, 
the results suffer from estimation bias. To overcome the endogeneity problem, we include 
only disclosing firms in the regression sample. This enables us to test for firm value 
differences due to differences in disclosure policy.  
Within the sample of firms reporting environmental information, we construct portfolios 
based on their disclosure characteristics. Using scores from the Carbon Disclosure Project, 
we assign the firms to an environmental disclosure index. From this index, we create three 
portfolios, and compare the firms with the highest, midrange and lowest levels of disclosure. 
To investigate the effect of changes in environmental disclosure, we create portfolios based 
on changes in the disclosure index. Firms are allocated to portfolios based on changes in 
disclosure score from last year, and we analyze differences among firms with improved, 
stable and aggravated disclosure. 
In the first part of the analysis, we test how environmental disclosure is related to accounting 
measures. We use Tobin’s Q as a valuation measure, and use proxies for environmental 
disclosure level as key independent variables. Regression results suggest that the level of 
disclosure is positively associated with firm value. We do not observe the same relation 
while looking at the impact of changes in disclosure level. In addition, we perform similar 
analyses with the operating measures ROE and ROA as dependent variables. On these 
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measures, the results of disclosure level effects are inconclusive, but we find an indication of 
a significant negative impact of disclosure change. 
In the second part of the paper, we look at firm value from a market perspective, and 
investigate differences in stock returns between the constructed portfolios. We apply the 
three-factor model of Fama and French (1993); and then augment it with the momentum 
factor proposed by Carhart (1997). We understand that this is a joint test of the efficient 
market hypothesis and the value relevance of environmental disclosure. To be specific, the 
alpha in a strategy of going long in the high and selling short in the low portfolio is expected 
to be zero if markets are efficient, irrespective of the relevancy of disclosure policy. 
However, a positive alpha implies that disclosure is important for firm valuation, and that 
markets react slowly to this information.    
First, we look at return differences between the portfolios based on level of disclosure. The 
results show that the quantity of disclosed information seems to be already incorporated in 
the market price. We find no evidence of a positive alpha in a strategy that buys the high 
disclosure portfolio and sells the low disclosure portfolio.  
Finally, we look at the portfolios based on changes in disclosure level, and evaluate a 
strategy of buying the improvement portfolio and selling the aggravation portfolio. The 
improved disclosure portfolio experiences a higher alpha than the stable portfolio. The 
portfolio with aggravated disclosure experiences the poorest alpha of the three.  This implies 
that improvements or aggravations in disclosure level appear to be relevant for firm 
valuation, but the market adjusts the stock price slowly. This finding indicates that firms 
benefit from improved environmental disclosure, in the form of higher stock returns.  
The paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides a review of the previous literature 
relevant for the topic. In chapter 3, we develop our hypotheses. Chapter 4 describes the 
dataset, research design and the methodology used in the empirical analysis. Chapter 5 
presents the empirical findings from the hypotheses analysis. Chapter 6 provides a 
discussion of our results and findings, and in chapter 7 we will offer concluding remarks. 
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2. Literature review 
The relationship between financial disclosure and firm value has been extensively analyzed 
in previous disclosure literature. Research on the impact of non-financial disclosure on firm 
value is less developed. With increasing focus on environmental and social consciousness 
and greater demand for documentation and reporting on these issues, the relationship 
between non-financial reporting and firm value is more relevant than ever.   
Most previous literature on disclosure and firm valuation focuses on financial or mandatory 
disclosure (Healy and Palepu 2001; Leuz and Wysocki 2008). The consensus in most of this 
literature is that there is a negative association between increased disclosure and cost of 
capital. Assuming an inverse relationship between cost of capital and stock prices (Bodie et 
al. 2009), increased disclosure may lead to increased firm value. While economics-based 
models of disclosure establish a link between financial, mandatory reporting and subsequent 
economic effects, discretionary disclosure theories describe the relationship between 
voluntary disclosure and consequences of such activities (Verrecchia 2001). For the purpose 
of our thesis, we divide the relevant discretionary theories into two branches. 
The first line of arguments presents models where firms are more likely to reveal favorable 
than unfavorable information to the market. The “good-news” theory of Verrecchia (1983) 
predicts managers to exercise discretion in disclosure decisions when investors have rational 
expectations about managerial actions. The decision to disclose or not is perceived as a 
signal indicating whether the information would have a positive or negative effect on the 
market price. A negative effect is either due to bad news or disclosure costs greater than the 
potential gains of disclosure. Managers decide the quantity of disclosed information based 
on predicted market reaction. This level of disclosure constitutes a disclosure threshold for 
the firm. Information above the threshold is withheld from the market. Investors are aware of 
the total information quantity possessed by the manager, but do not know the content. They 
will interpret the absence of disclosure as consistent with the information being above the 
disclosure threshold, signaling either bad news or high disclosure costs. Orlitzky and Whelan 
(2007) argue that the impact of signaling and transaction costs, as well as various other costs 
and benefits of disclosure, affect the disclosure quantity of the firm. They conclude that the 
level of social and environmental accounting should be set so that marginal costs of 
disclosure equal marginal benefits. Verrecchia (1983) predicts that firms with high potential 
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benefits connected to disclosure will disclose more information compared to firms with less 
potential benefits.  
A second branch of discretionary disclosure literature suggests that that managers aim to 
create a reputation of providing credible disclosures, as a way to reduce market transaction 
costs (Healy and Palepu 2001). Theory on market liquidity proposes reduced information 
asymmetry as a potential benefit of increased disclosure. Uninformed investors may be less 
willing to trade in the stock market as a consequence of asymmetric information and adverse 
selection problems (Leuz and Wysocki 2008). Hence, disclosure decisions may affect capital 
allocation in the market. Reduced investor willingness to participate in market transactions 
may lead to market illiquidity and increased ask-bid spreads (Verrecchia 2001). Increased 
disclosure, more widespread information to investors, and publicity may increase the 
awareness and lead to an increased investor base for the firm (Merton 1987).  This implies 
that the firm might benefit from investing resources in the improvement of quality or 
quantity of the disclosed information. Healy et al. (1999) find evidence that suggests 
increased voluntary firm disclosure to be linked to improved stock performance and 
increased stock liquidity. This line of literature suggests that firms should increase 
discretionary disclosure irrespective of good or bad news because such a policy will, with all 
other things held constant, increase firm value.   
Disclosure of corporate social responsibility, and environmental responsibility as a subset of 
this, might affect financial performance through other channels than financial disclosure 
(Rodriguez et al. 2006). From a business perspective, theory suggests that CSR and 
environmental consciousness can be utilized to differentiate products and brands in 
competitive markets, and can be viewed as an investment in product differentiation 
(McWilliams and Siegel 2001). The disclosure of environmental activities can be a channel 
for communicating environmental commitment as a part of the differentiation strategy. 
Discretionary disclosure theory predicts voluntary disclosure reports to be used by high 
performing companies to distinguish themselves from low performing companies 
(Verrecchia 1983). Another channel of influence on financial performance is through 
investor preferences. Investors with high social awareness are willing to receive a lower rate 
of return on an investment in a social responsible firm (Richardson and Welker 2001).  
Effects of disclosure are likely to affect the investment decisions of shareholders if the 
information disclosed is perceived as relevant to firm value. The literature examining the 
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effects of voluntary environmental disclosure on firm value is not conclusive on whether 
environmental information is value relevant for investors. Clarkson et al. (2008) divides 
previous literature within the field of environmental accounting research into three broad 
groups. The first group of studies examines the relevance of environmental performance 
information on firm valuation. The second category consists of studies that investigate the 
factors that affect managerial decisions on disclosure of environmental risks and 
opportunities. The last section of studies focuses on the relationship between firms’ 
environmental performance and the level of environmental reporting and disclosure. We will 
mainly focus on literature from the first category in our literature review. 
The earliest studies in this group of on environmental accounting research focus on specific 
events or liabilities, and subsequent impact on stock prices. Blacconiere and Patten (1994) 
examine the effects of a substantial chemical leak in India in 1984, and find evidence of a 
significant negative market reaction after the event. However, the reaction is mitigated for 
firms with more extensive environmental disclosures prior to the event, compared to other 
firms. Blacconiere and Northcut (1997) examine the relation between stock price changes 
due to the introduction of new environmental legislation in 1984 and environmental data of 
chemical firms. The study finds that firms with more comprehensive environmental 
reporting have an impaired negative stock price reaction to environmental regulation 
compared to less extensive disclosers. These studies differ from our study as they examine 
the effects of specific environmental events and mandatory disclosures on stock prices, but 
their findings document the existence of a relationship between environmental disclosure 
and firm valuation. 
Yamashita et al. (1999) examines the rewards of environmental consciousness in the U.S. 
capital market. They reveal a positive, but insignificant effect on stock prices after the 
revelation of information on firm environmental consciousness. The study concludes that 
information on environmental performance does not appear to be very important for 
investors’ short-term decisions in the capital markets. Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) find that 
environmental disclosure might reveal environmental practices which affect the financial 
performance of the firm, and thereby firm value. Clarkson et al. (2008) find a positive 
association between environmental performance and the level of social or environmental 
disclosure. Their analysis focuses on the rationale behind voluntary environmental 
disclosures, but does not answer whether or not non-financial disclosures have the intended 
valuation consequences.  
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Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn (2011) find announcements of commitment to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions to be received negatively in the stock market. Firms experience 
significant negative abnormal stock returns as a consequence of such announcements, and 
their results show overall evidence of a conflict between environmental disclosure and firm 
value maximization. Dhaliwal et al. (2010) find that more stakeholder-oriented countries 
have stronger negative association between CSR reports and financial forecasts than 
countries with less matured CSR activities. They find evidence that firms’ social 
performance has a greater likelihood of affecting the financial performance of the firm in 
stakeholder-oriented countries than in other countries. Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) provides a 
simultaneous equations approach to the relation between environmental disclosure, 
environmental performance and economic performance. The study reveals good 
environmental performers to disclose more than poor environmental performers, in 
accordance with discretionary disclosure theory on “good news”.  
Dhaliwal et al. (2011) look at the relation between voluntary corporate social disclosure and 
cost of capital, and investigate whether an initiation of voluntary disclosure is associated to a 
reduction in future cost of capital. They find that firms with a high prior year cost of capital 
are more likely to initiate voluntary disclosures of corporate social responsibility. The cost of 
capital reduction due to disclosure is superior for firms with high social performance, and 
firms that initiate voluntary disclosure appears to exploit the reduction benefit. These firms 
are more likely to raise capital after initiation, suggesting that corporate social disclosure has 
an impact on market capital allocation.  
Richardson and Welker (2001) analyze the relationship between both financial and social 
disclosure and firms’ cost of capital. In accordance with previous research, they find quantity 
and quality of financial disclosure to have a negative relation to cost of capital. Social 
disclosure behaves differently than expected and have an opposite effect. Results indicate a 
significant, positive relation between the level of social disclosure and cost of capital. 
Valuation models suggest an inverse relation between cost of capital and share price. Hence, 
their analysis implies that increased non-financial disclosure raises the firms cost of capital 
and lower share price (Richardson and Welker 2001).  
Aerts et al. (2008) and Cormier and Magnan (2007) find evidence of an opposite relation 
between environmental disclosure and cost of capital in some contexts. Aerts et al. (2008) 
find that improved environmental disclosure translates into more precise analyst earnings 
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forecasts. This relation suggests a reduction in firms cost of capital and increased stock 
prices. They find the effect to vary according to industry, country and disclosure venue. The 
effect is mitigated in environmentally sensitive industries. Cormier and Magnan (2007) 
examine the relation between environmental disclosures and firm earnings and stock market 
value in country-specific settings. They base their study on environmental disclosures from 
Canada, France and Germany from 1992-1998. Their findings suggest that the decision to 
report environmental information is related to firm earnings and stock market valuation for 
German firms, but they fail to document a relation in France and Canada.  
Two recent studies of direct relevance to our paper are Clarkson et al. (2010) and Plumlee et 
al. (2010). Clarkson et al. (2010) examine the impact of voluntary environmental disclosure 
on cost of capital and overall firm value. Their results show evidence of voluntary 
environmental disclosures being value relevant for investors in their assessment of future 
environmental risks and liabilities. They find a positive association between voluntary 
environmental disclosure and overall firm value, but fail to document an effect on cost of 
capital. 
Plumlee et al. (2010) examine the relationship between environmental disclosure and overall 
firm value by analyzing both the denominator and numerator component of free cash flow 
valuation: cost of capital and cash flow. By using a self-constructed environmental 
disclosure quality index they find a positive relationship between disclosure quality and cost 
of capital. This result is consistent with the findings of Richardson and Welker (2001). 
However, they find a negative association between the issuance of standalone CSR reports 
and cost of capital. The latter is in accordance with discretionary disclosure theory that 
predicts decreased information asymmetry to reduce cost of capital. When analyzing the 
numerator component, they find that higher quality of voluntary environmental disclosure is 
positively associated with firms’ expected future cash flow and thereby firm value. The 
study documents evidence of an overall positive effect of environmental disclosure on firm 
value.  
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3. Hypothesis development 
In our study, we aim to investigate if voluntary environmental disclosure has an effect on 
firm value. Our goal is to determine whether differences in environmental disclosure 
characteristics affect stock returns and overall firm value.   
Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) suggest that the quality of environmental disclosure can serve as an 
indication to the market of the quality of the firm’s environmental practices. The 
environmental disclosures communicate information to the market about firm specific risks 
and liabilities connected to the environmental issues. Disclosure also provides information 
about potential emissions reduction and cleaning costs. Some recent studies suggest a 
positive effect of voluntary non-financial disclosure on firm value (Plumlee et al. 2010; 
Clarkson et al. 2010), while others suggest a negative relation (Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn 
2011; Richardson and Welker 2001). All mentioned studies find disclosure to have an impact 
on firm valuation, but the findings are inconclusive on the direction of the effect. Based on 
this, we predict environmental disclosure to have an effect on firm value and develop our 
main null hypothesis: 
H: Voluntary environmental disclosure is not associated with firm value. 
Most previous studies have mainly focused on the effect of social or environmental 
disclosure on stock prices through cost of capital (Dhaliwal et al 2011; Clarkson et al 2010; 
Plumlee et al 2010). We divide the term “firm value”, and investigate the relation from both 
a market and an accounting perspective, and develop further specifications of our main 
hypotheses.  
First, we look at the effects of disclosure on accounting measures of firm value. Theory 
suggests that environmental disclosure can be implemented as part of a differentiation 
strategy in competitive markets. High performing firms use discretionary disclosures to 
distinguish themselves from low performing firms (Verrecchia 1983), implying that 
voluntary environmental disclosures can be used in a differentiation strategy to set good 
environmental performers apart from poor environmental performers. However, disclosure 
initiatives are connected with disclosure costs, and these costs are increasing with the extent 
of disclosure. McWilliams and Siegel (2001) propose that the costs of disclosure can be seen 
as investment in brand management. These arguments suggest that disclosure have an effect 
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on the accounting value of firms, and that the direction of the impact depends on whether the 
costs or benefits of disclosure are greater. We specify the following subset of hypothesis H:  
H_I: A firm’s voluntary environmental disclosure is not associated with the accounting 
value of the firm. 
From a market perspective, we look at stock returns. The level of environmental disclosure 
reflects the amount of environmental information, risks and opportunities that is 
communicated to the market. Following the “good news” theory of Verrecchia (1983), 
managers will choose to disclose information to an information threshold. Managers 
consider information above the threshold as having an unfavorable effect on firm value, due 
to high disclosure costs or bad news. Investors will interpret the lack of disclosure as a signal 
that the information withheld will cause a negative market reaction. Firms with good news 
will then benefit from disclosing as much as possible. The second branch of discretionary 
disclosure literature suggests that discretionary disclosure increase firm value, regardless of 
good or bad news. High discretionary disclosure might lower market transaction costs and 
reduce information asymmetry (Healy and Palepu 2001; Leuz and Wysocki 2008; 
Verrecchia 2001). Healy et al. (1999) find evidence of increased voluntary firm disclosure to 
be associated with improved stock performance. Environmental disclosures might affect 
stock returns through investor preferences. Social responsible investors will accept lower 
rates of return on social responsible investments (Richardson and Welker 2001). Investors 
whose goal is profit maximization and who do not have the same preferences for social 
responsibility will not accept the discount on returns.  Based on these arguments we predict 
that voluntary environmental disclosure to be value relevant for investors, and specify the 
following null hypothesis: 
H_II: A firm’s environmental disclosure is not associated with stock returns 
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4. Methodology 
In this chapter, we present the methodology used in the empirical analysis chapter. We 
describe the approach, econometric methods, and dataset used in the analysis. 
4.1 Analytical approach 
We use regression methodology to test our main hypotheses. Previous research within the 
area of interest have applied several research designs; most commonly event-study or 
regression analysis. We assume the environmental disclosure score to be a summary of the 
transparency and voluntary disclosure of the firm throughout the year. Based on this 
assumption, it is not possible to pin-point exact announcement date and an event-study is not 
suited as research design as it looks at the effect of certain events within a short time 
window. Hence, we choose to apply regression models in our thesis. 
To investigate the impact of environmental disclosure characteristics, we construct two sets 
of portfolios. One set of portfolios is based on disclosure level, and the other set is 
constructed based on changes in disclosure score. Orlitzky and Whelan (2007) suggest that 
the level of social and environmental accounting should be set at a level at which the 
marginal costs equals the marginal benefits of disclosure. Verrecchia (1983) predict 
managers to use discretion in disclosure decisions and disclose information up to a threshold 
level. Information above the threshold causes a negative market reaction, and is unfavorable 
for the firm. Based on this, we suspect the effect of absolute level of disclosure to be 
influential on managerial disclosure decisions, and we divide the disclosure sample into 3 
portfolios: high, midrange and low disclosure.  
We also want to test whether changes in disclosure from one year to the next are relevant for 
investors. An improvement in voluntary environmental disclosure might be perceived as a 
signal of increased environmental consciousness. Assuming that environmental 
consciousness is value relevant to investors, we expect this signal-effect to impact market 
valuation. To examine the effect of improvement or aggravation in disclosure, we construct 
three portfolios based on changes in disclosure level: improvement, no change and 
aggravation.  
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We apply the analysis on both sets of portfolios, and test the effects of disclosure 
characteristics on accounting and market measures. In addition to the portfolio division, we 
use disclosure score and change in score as alternative proxies for disclosure characteristics. 
To investigate our two sub-hypotheses we use two different sets of models and variables. 
From an accounting perspective, we measure firm value as Tobin’s Q and test if there are 
significant differences between the groups of firms within each portfolio set. As a robustness 
test, we use alternative measures of firm value.  
Next, we test the effect of environmental disclosure characteristics on market returns. This is 
not easy in our current setting because the disclosure score sums information that can be 
available through the year, and we cannot use an event study to isolate the effect of a 
disclosure score announcement. However, if markets are not efficient and disclosure has an 
impact on firm value, we might find differences between the two groups. We use the three-
factor model of Fama and French (1993) and then we add the momentum factor of Carhart 
(1997) to investigate the effects of disclosure on stock returns. This is a joint test of the 
efficient market hypothesis and the effect of environmental disclosure. No observable 
differences in returns do not necessarily imply that disclosure has no impact, but positive 
alphas in such strategies are evidence of the disclosure relevancy.  
 
All statistical analyses are performed in STATA.  
4.2 Environmental disclosure and firm value 
To analyze whether firm-specific environmental disclosure is associated with differences in 
firm value, we use regression analysis based primarily on accounting measurements. 
Following a similar logic to Gompers et al. (2003), we estimate the following regression;  
                                      
Tobin’s Q is the dependent variable,     is the disclosure variable,    is a vector of control 
variables and     is an error term.  
4.2.1 Pooled OLS regression  
The underlying data is unbalanced panel data, with both time-series and cross-sectional 
dimensions. The panel is unbalanced because not all cross-sectional members have 
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observations for all years. To analyze the data with OLS regression, we pool the cross 
sections over time by including year dummy variables in the regression equation: 
                                                                   
                                        . 
Where Tobin’s Q is the dependent variable and      is the disclosure variable. All variables 
used in regression analysis are explained in section 4.4.5. When we apply OLS regression, 
we assume that the idiosyncratic error       is uncorrelated with the independent variables in 
each time period (Woolridge 2009). We assume no correlation, but are aware of a very likely 
endogeneity problem connected to this assumption. The problem of endogeneity occurs 
when the independent variable is correlated with the error term. This implies that the 
regression coefficients in the pooled OLS regression are biased (Woolridge 2009). Hence, if 
disclosure has an impact on firm value, then the firms that benefit the most from disclosure 
are the ones that will choose to do so. This magnifies the effect of disclosure. To overcome 
this problem, the main analysis of our hypotheses is based on a sample restricted to only 
disclosing firms. By looking at differences within this sample, we try to minimize the 
endogeneity problem. 
4.2.2 Fixed effects model 
Panel data can alternatively be analyzed through unobserved effects panel data methods. 
There are two common models, fixed effects and random effects transformations. We do a 
Hausman test to determine whether to use a random effects or fixed effects model.
2
 The null 
hypothesis in the Hausman test is rejected, and we use fixed effects.  
The fixed effects model uses a transformation to remove the unobserved effect    prior to 
estimation, and remove all time-constant independent variables (Woolridge 2009). Under 
OLS assumption, correlation between the unobserved effect and the independent variables 
will cause biased results. With fixed effects estimation, the unobserved effect    is allowed 
                                                 
2 We compute a Hausman test in STATA under the full set of random effects assumptions. We use random effects estimates 
unless the Hausman test reject the assumption Cov(xijt, ai) = 0, and find the unobservable effect ai to be correlated with one 
or more explanatory variables. A rejection means that the key assumptions of the random effect model are false, and thus, 
we use the fixed effects model (Woolridge 2009)  
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to be correlated with the independent variables in the regression equation. STATA conducts 
the necessary adjustments to the regression.  
                                                                      
Where      is the idiosyncratic error, and represents unobserved factors that change over time 
and affect the dependent variable, and       is the disclosure variable. All regression variables 
are described in section 4.4.5. 
4.3 Environmental disclosure and stock returns 
In this section, we describe the method applied in the analysis where we look at stock 
returns. By dividing the sample into portfolios based on disclosure characteristics, we are 
able to examine differences in market performance between portfolios. We derive portfolio 
returns and evaluate the portfolio performance through factor model regressions. The 
portfolio construction is described in section 4.4.4. 
4.3.1 Portfolio returns 
In order to derive the monthly returns for each portfolio, we retrieve a monthly return index, 
RI, for each stock from Datastream. This return index shows the monthly growth in share 
holdings, assuming dividends to be re-invested. Based on this, we calculate the monthly 
returns for each stock over the five-year period covered in this paper, following standard 
procedures in the literature (e.g. Bodie et al. 2009):   
    
          
     
 
We calculate both equal-weighted and value-weighted returns for each portfolio. In the 
calculation of the equal-weighted returns, we add the monthly returns of all the firms within 
the portfolio, and then divide the total return on the number of firms. For each period t, the 
equal-weighted portfolio return   
  is calculated as follows: 
  
  
 
 
 ∑    
 
   
 
Where n is the number of firms in the portfolio and     is the monthly return of firm i.  
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The value weighted returns are calculated based on the firms’ market capitalization as a 
fraction of the total portfolio market capitalization. Since there are firms from several 
countries included in the dataset, all data are converted into one common currency.    is the 
market capitalization of firm i and n is the number of firms in the portfolio.  The market 
capitalization of each firm is retrieved from Datastream. The value-weighted portfolio return 
  
  is then calculated according to the following equation for each period t:  
  
  ∑             
  
∑   
 
    
 
   
 
The efficient market hypothesis predicts stock price to reflect all value-relevant information 
available to investors. A market is defined as efficient if the prices of securities fully reflect 
public information (Fama 1970). Investors trading in such a market should expect to obtain 
an equilibrium rate of return on their investments. When new information becomes available, 
the efficient market hypothesis predicts the stock price to respond quickly to the information 
and adjust to the fair level, where ordinary rates of return can be expected. The price will at 
all times reflect all current information, and only change in response to new information 
(Fama 1970).  
Hence, in a semi-strong efficient market, there would be no potential benefit of active 
investment-management strategies. Stock prices would already reflect all relevant 
information and attempts to outperform passive strategies would be futile. A passive 
investment strategy would yield the same profits without the additional costs of active 
strategies. 
4.3.2 Factor model regression 
From a market perspective, we aim to examine the relationship between voluntary 
environmental disclosure and stock returns. The analysis of differences in stock returns is a 
joint test of the market efficiency hypothesis and the impact of voluntary environmental 
disclosure. We assume our Nordic capital markets to have a semi-strong form of market 
efficiency; where the stock price reflects historical information and all publicly available 
information regarding the firms’ prospects.  
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The efficient market hypothesis predicts that security prices reflect all available information 
and it is difficult to outperform passive strategies through active management. Findings that 
do not reconcile with the market efficiency hypothesis are referred to as market anomalies. 
Patterns of returns that seem to contradict the efficient market hypothesis are interpreted in 
multiple ways in empirical finance. Several methods have been developed to account for the 
effects of differences in returns, and some equity characteristics have been identified as 
influential factors on realized returns.  
Fama and French (1993) propose that market anomalies can be explained as results of risk 
premiums, and they interpreted the excess returns as risk premiums connected with the firm 
characteristics. They developed a three-factor model with systematic factors constructed to 
account for the effects of firm-level exposure to the market, market capitalization and book-
to-market ratio. Carhart (1997) added one additional factor, and developed a four-factor 
model. The forth factor is constructed to capture momentum effects in the market, since one-
year return momentum have been shown to significantly forecast future returns. 
The factors are constructed by forming portfolios that mimic the risk connected to these 
characteristics. These models can be seen as performance attribution models that attribute 
differences in portfolio returns to different firm characteristics (Gompers et al. 2003). For 
our purposes, we only apply the model as a method of assessing performance attribution of 
firm characteristics and do not discuss the factors as proxies for risk.  
We start our analysis by investigating the portfolio returns and whether there are differences 
in the returns over the period. In accordance with the efficient market hypothesis we expect 
the three portfolios to yield equal returns. If the three portfolios differ significantly in firm 
characteristics, then a disparity in returns might be explained by the differences in style 
factors. We base our analysis on the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) and the 
four-factor model of Carhart (1997). The three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) is 
specified as follows: 
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Carhart (1997) adds a return momentum factor to the three-factor model, and the four-factor 
model is given by  
                                             
Where    is the dependent variable,      ,     ,       and      are the independent 
variables,    to    are the factor coefficients, and    is the error variable.  
The dependent variable    in the factor models is monthly excess stock return. We use both 
excess portfolio returns and return difference between the extreme portfolios as   . For each 
month t, excess stock return is measured as portfolio return     less risk-free rate:  
           
In addition, we calculate monthly return differences between the extreme portfolios in each 
set of portfolios. The return difference        is calculated as the monthly excess return of 
portfolio 1 minus the excess return of portfolio 3. Portfolio 1 represents the upper extreme 
portfolios: high disclosure or improvement in disclosure. Portfolio 3 represents the lower 
extreme portfolios: low disclosure or aggravation in disclosure.   
             
The alpha – α – is the estimated intercept coefficient. We follow the logic of Gompers et al. 
(2003) and interpret this coefficient as the abnormal return of the investment; return beyond 
what could have been gained by a passive investment in the factors.       is the value-
weighted market return in month t less the risk-free return, and     ,      and      are 
the month t returns on factor-mimicking, zero-investing portfolios constructed to capture 
size, book-to-market and return momentum effects (Carhart 1997). The coefficients    to   , 
are often called factor loadings. If the factors are relevant in explaining return disparities, 
then excess return should be explained by performance attribution due to these factor 
loadings. The intercept of the equation, α, should be zero if the factors fully explain the 
portfolio. The factors are described in detail in section 4.4.6. 
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4.4 Dataset 
In this section we introduce the Carbon Disclosure Project and present the underlying data 
used in the analysis.  
4.4.1 Carbon Disclosure Project 
The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) is an independent, non-profit organization that works 
for emissions reduction and sustainable use of natural resources. The organization provides a 
global standard for measurement and disclosure of information on climate change, and holds 
the largest collection of self-reported climate change data in the world (Carbon Disclosure 
Project, 2012). The Carbon Disclosure Project acts on behalf of institutional investors and 
help them reduce the climate change related risks in their portfolios and make sustainable 
investment decisions. A main focus in the Carbon Disclosure Projects strategy is to ensure 
that collected data is available, comparable and used efficiently (Carbon Disclosure Project, 
2012). The reported information is submitted through a standard questionnaire, and the 
organization provides extensive guidelines on how to respond and report according to this 
questionnaire.  
Based on the reported information, the CDP produce and publish several annual reports 
(Carbon Disclosure Project, 2012). In 2007, they expanded their publications to the Nordic 
countries and for the first time published a CDP Nordic report. This report summarizes the 
responses and submitted information of the largest listed firms in Finland, Denmark, Sweden 
and Norway.  
4.4.1.1 Carbon Disclosure Score 
The carbon disclosure score is determined based on firms’ self-declared answers to the CDP 
questionnaire. This questionnaire is designed to best assess the understanding and disclosure 
of firm-specific exposure to climate-related issues, as well as the strategic and managerial 
focus on the business issues related to climate change. The extent of emission measurement 
and frequency and relevance of emissions disclosure are also important elements in the 
questionnaire and important in the determination of the final carbon disclosure score 
achieved. This questionnaire is initially self-declared, but firms can choose to have their 
reported answers verified externally. Externally verified data ensure greater confidence in 
the submitted material, and reflects positive in the assessment process (Carbon Disclosure 
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Project, 2011). Firms are ranked on a scale ranging from a minimum score of zero to a 
maximum score of 100. 
The CDP Nordic report for 2011 provides guidelines for investors to interpret the ranking in 
levels of commitment to carbon disclosure. Firms with a disclosure score between 0 and 50 
are described as low disclosing firms. Firms within this range have shown limited 
commitment to disclose climate related risks and emissions. Carbon disclosure scores 
between 50 and 70 are denoted as midrange. Firms in this range have an increased 
commitment to emission disclosure, and report more company-specific risks and 
opportunities. Firms with a carbon disclosure score above 70 are referred to as high 
disclosing firms. These are firms with high understanding of the business issues connected to 
climate change and emissions, and where these issues are built in to the core business 
(Carbon Disclosure Project, 2011).  
4.4.2 Data description and sample selection 
Our dataset consists of data for firms that have their primary listing on the stock exchange in 
Oslo, Stockholm, Copenhagen or Helsinki over the time period of 2006 - 2011. We retrieved 
all available ISIN numbers for firms with primary listings on the Nordic stock exchanges 
from the Compustat database. Firms we were unable to retrieve ISIN numbers for are 
excluded from the population. The sample of disclosing firms consist of firms that intersect 
on two data sources: firms that have their primary listing on one of the Nordic stock 
exchanges and firms that disclose their environmental performance to the Carbon Disclosure 
Project. All accounting and financial measures are retrieved from the Datastream database. 
The accounting data is retrieved annually at the end of the year, while the financial data is 
retrieved monthly. The disclosure data consists of annual carbon disclosure scores, retrieved 
from CDP Nordic reports
3
. Carbon disclosure scores are listed in appendix 1. 
The population includes firms from four different countries. Most firms report their 
accounting and financial data in their national currency. In order to achieve a meaningful 
analysis we have to convert all underlying data to one common currency. We retrieve 
monthly averages of daily listings of exchange rates from the Norwegian Central Bank
4
. To 
                                                 
3 Annual CDP Nordic reports are available at: https://www.cdproject.net/en-US/Results/Pages/All-Investor-Reports.aspx 
4 Exchange rate listings are retrieved from: http://www.norges-bank.no/no/prisstabilitet/valutakurser/ 
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achieve the required comparability, we translate all financial values and accounting measures 
into Norwegian Kroner (NOK). For the monthly data we use monthly listings in the 
conversion, and for the annual data we use end of year listings.  
4.4.3 Data adjustments 
The initial Nordic population includes a total of 766 listed firms. This includes 4656 annual 
observations of accounting data and a total of 51,509 monthly return observations. 
Regression analyses are vulnerable to extreme observation and outliers. We chose not to 
exclude outliers, because due to the nature of the capital markets included in the sample, we 
have no reason to believe the outliers are caused by errors in the dataset
5
.  
We exclude all observations with missing values and firms with incomplete data on all 
accounting variables. We have no reason to believe there is a systematic pattern in the 
missing observations, and hence, we believe that this adjustment will not create a bias in our 
results. 
After adjusting for missing values and observations, the final population consists of a total of 
36,448 monthly observations. This implies a reduction in observations of approximately 30 
per cent. This is a significant reduction, but we find it necessary in order to ensure the 
quality of our analysis. We will refer to this adjusted, underlying population as the Nordic 
sample. As a consequence of the adjustments in the underlying population, the disclosure 
sample is adjusted accordingly. The final disclosure sample consists of 6180 observations of 
monthly returns. The final samples are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1: Sample description 
Year Initial population Nordic sample Initial sample Disclosure sample 
2007 766 570 84 70 
2008 766 574 110 99 
2009 766 574 128 110 
2010 766 574 131 113 
2011 766 573 143 123 
Initial population is the entire Nordic population before data adjustments.  Nordic sample is the underlying population adjusted for missing 
data. Initial sample consists of firms that have their primary listing on the Nordic stock exchanges and disclose to the Carbon Disclosure 
Project. Disclosure sample is the adjusted disclosure sample. 
                                                 
5 See appendix 2 for further examination of the outlying observations in the dataset. 
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Listed in Table 2 and 3 are the distributions by country. The distribution is fairly stable over 
the entire time period, with Sweden having the largest percentage of disclosing firms.  
Table 2: Nordic sample distribution  
Stock Exchange 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Oslo Stock Exchange 151 155 155 155 155 
OMX Stockholm 206 206 206 206 206 
OMX Copenhagen 103 103 103 103 102 
OMX Helsinki 110 110 110 110 110 
TOTAL 570 574 574 574 573 
 
Table 3: Disclosure sample distribution  
Stock Exchange 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Oslo Stock Exchange 12 13 15 19 23 
OMX Stockholm 34 45 50 49 51 
OMX Copenhagen 9 16 23 21 22 
OMX Helsinki 15 19 22 24 26 
TOTAL 70 99 110 113 123 
 
4.4.4 Portfolio construction 
We divide the disclosure sample into portfolio sets to analyze the effects of disclosure 
characteristics on firm value. The portfolios are reset at the start of each year, according to 
the new environmental disclosure ranking. This implies that investors sell their investment in 
the portfolio at the end of the year, and then reinvest at the start of the year in the adjusted 
portfolio.  
There have been several measures for the degree of non-financial disclosure in related 
literature. Clarkson et al. (2010) and Plumlee et al. (2010) use self-constructed disclosure 
indices based on information retrieved from voluntary environmental disclosures in 
standalone environmental reports, CSR reports and corporate websites. Richardson and 
Welker (2001) use a social measure drawn from the Society of Management Accountants of 
Canada, which provide time-series data on disclosure scores based on disclosed information 
in annual reports. To construct an environmental disclosure index for the Nordic capital 
markets, following a similar  approach to Clarkson et al. (2010) and Plumlee et al. (2010), is 
to time-demanding and complex for the scope of our thesis. We base our measure of 
disclosure on data drawn from a third party source, and use the carbon disclosure score from 
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the CDP Nordic reports as a measure for voluntary environmental disclosure. It allows us to 
compare the transparency on environmental issues of the sample firms.  
We believe the carbon disclosure score is a well-suited proxy for voluntary environmental 
disclosure. The Carbon Disclosure Project rank the sample firms according to understanding 
and disclosure of firm-specific exposure to climate-related issues, as well as the strategic and 
managerial focus on environmental issues. One section of the CDP questionnaire assesses 
the firm’s own communication of environmental disclosure based on information about the 
frequency, extent and relevance of their own reporting (Carbon Disclosure Project, 2012).  
The CDP questionnaire relates to the previous fiscal year (Carbon Disclosure Project 2011), 
which implies that the carbon disclosure score of 2011 represent the assessment of firm 
disclosure of 2010 data. The CDP Nordic report is made publicly available in September 
each year. However, all firms in the disclosure sample communicate firm sustainability and 
environmental commitments throughout the year via firm websites or company reports
6
. 
Based on this, we consider the disclosure score to represent information about firm 
disclosure policy that has been available for stakeholders throughout the year. An analyst 
following the sample firms would, based on the continuous communication of environmental 
activities, be able to assess and rank the firms based on disclosure policy, and thus, the 
portfolios are set at the beginning of the year. Hence, for an investor wanting to follow an 
investment strategy based on disclosure characteristics, the information required to construct 
such portfolios is available at the beginning of the year. In addition, we believe that in order 
for the gains of disclosure to be compared to the corresponding costs of disclosure, the 
accounting measures of year t have to be compared to the disclosure score of year t.      
4.4.4.1 Disclosure Level Portfolios 
First, we construct portfolios based on the absolute level of disclosure. We rank the sample 
firms according to their carbon disclosure score from the CDP Nordic report, where a score 
of 100 reflects perfect disclosure, and zero is consistent with no disclosure. We use this to 
divide the sample into three portfolios. The lowest 30 per cent of the firms on the index is in 
the low disclosure portfolio (Low). Firms in the upper 30 per cent on the index are in the 
high disclosure portfolio (High). The rest of the firms in the sample constitute the midrange 
                                                 
6 Listed in appendix 3 are the addresses of the sustainability websites for the firms in the Disclosure sample. These sites are 
where the firms communicate their environmental information to the public.  
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disclosure portfolio (Midrange). The environmental disclosure index and subsequent 
portfolios are adjusted each year, according to the new annual carbon disclosure score. Table 
4 describes the portfolio distribution and show minimum, maximum and mean disclosure 
score for the firms in each portfolio.  
Table 4: Disclosure Level Portfolios 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
High 
Mean 
Max 
Min 
75.16 
100 
64 
70.73 
89 
57 
71.42 
84 
67 
79.40 
90 
71 
81.54 
97 
74 
n 19 30 35 33 39 
Midrange 
Mean 
Max 
Min 
49.32 
63 
34 
47.75 
56 
39 
59.03 
66 
48 
63.4 
70 
58 
66.64 
73 
59 
n 31 36 40 45 47 
Low 
Mean 
Max 
Min 
18.95 
32 
0 
28.33 
38 
12 
31.29 
45 
5 
37.43 
57 
8 
43.89 
58 
1 
n 20 27 35 35 36 
Total 
Mean 
Max 
Min 
47.66 
100 
0 
49.53 
89 
12 
54.15 
84 
5 
60.03 
90 
8 
64.69 
97 
1 
n 70 93 110 113 123 
Listed is the mean, maximum and minimum value of the environmental disclosure score. N is the number of firms in each portfolio. 
 
4.4.4.2 Disclosure Change Portfolios 
Next, we allocate firms into portfolios according to change in disclosure level from the 
previous year. This is to capture whether improvement or aggravation in environmental 
disclosure score has an effect on firm value. We use each firms first reporting year as “base” 
year, and lose 12 monthly observations of stock returns for each firm. This implies that firms 
that only have reported to the Carbon Disclosure Project one year are excluded from the 
sample.  
The change score is calculated by subtracting the environmental disclosure score of year t-1 
from the score in year t. Firms with an improvement of more than five points in disclosure 
score from year t-1 to year t are allocated to the Pos_Change portfolio. Firms that experience 
a decline in disclosure score of more than five points from year t-1 to year t are in the 
Neg_Change portfolio. Firms with a stable disclosure score or firms that experience an 
increase or decrease in disclosure level of less than five points are in the No_Change 
portfolio. Table 5 describes the disclosure change portfolios. 
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Table 5: Disclosure Change Portfolios 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Pos_Change 
Mean 
Max 
Min 
n 
60.65 
88 
20 
26 
64.52 
84 
30 
46 
68.79 
90 
18 
39 
71.93 
97 
41 
41 
No_Change 
Mean 
Max 
Min 
n 
51.23 
89 
33 
13 
49.92 
79 
22 
13 
62.44 
83 
24 
41 
69.49 
89 
49 
39 
Neg_Change 
Mean 
Max 
Min 
n 
44.83 
74 
12 
24 
42.17 
71 
7 
29 
47.26 
63 
20 
19 
53.05 
83 
12 
21 
Total 
Mean 
Max 
Min 
n 
52.68 
89 
12 
63 
55.00 
84 
7 
87 
62.03 
90 
18 
99 
67.06 
97 
12 
101 
Listed is the mean, maximum and minimum value of the environmental disclosure score. N is the number of firms in each portfolio. 
4.4.5 Variable description 
In this section, we describe the regression variables used in the pooled OLS regression and 
the fixed effects regression.  
4.4.5.1  Measures of firm value 
To study the impact of disclosure on firm value, we look at several firm performance 
measures. There are various measurements of firm performance in related literature, and 
there is no common consensus on which approach is best to follow. We follow Gompers et 
al. (2003) and choose Tobin’s Q as main proxy for firm value. This measure contains both 
market information and information about assets in place, which makes it a suitable proxy in 
our thesis.  
Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio of market value of the firm to the replacement costs of the 
firm’s assets (Lindenberg and Ross 1981). If Tobin’s Q is higher than one, then the market 
value of the firm is higher than the recorded value of the firm’s assets. This suggests that 
there are unrecorded assets valued in the firm. Tobin’s Q has been used as proxy for growth 
opportunities in previous literature (Dhaliwal et al 2011), because Tobin’s Q might reflect a 
long-term perspective of firm valuation. We follow the method applied by Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) and calculate Tobin’s Q as the market value of assets divided by the book 
value of assets. Market value of assets is defined as book value of assets plus the market 
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value of common equity less the sum of the book value of equity and balance sheet deferred 
taxes. Deferred taxes are the accumulated taxes that are deferred as a result of timing 
differences between accounting values of assets and liabilities and the reporting value for tax 
purposes. Following the literature we use the natural logarithms of Tobin’s Q to incorporate 
non-linear relations. 
We use alternative measures for firm performance to test the robustness of our results. One 
concern connected to using Tobin’s Q as proxy for firm value is that we neglect the 
possibility that industries might systematically differ in voluntary environmental disclosure. 
A failure to industry-adjust could lead to distortions in the regression results. We compute an 
industry median Q for each year, and use it to find the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q for each 
firm (Gompers et al. 2003). The industry-adjusted value measure – Q’ – is calculated as the 
firm’s Tobin’s Q minus the industry median Tobin’s Q. The industry median is based on the 
two-digit sector code from Global Industry Classification Standard (see appendix 4), and 
calculated from the Nordic sample.  
Both Tobin’s Q and industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q are measures of financial performance and 
based on both market and accounting information. In addition to these two measures, we use 
return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) as alternative proxies for firm value to 
examine whether we find the same results when we use operating performance as proxy for 
firm value. Both ROE and ROA show the relation between annual firm income and 
accounting values of equity and assets. The operating measures represent a still picture of the 
firm profitability and reflect a short-term firm value compared to Tobin’s Q. Return on 
equity is retrieved from Datastream and defined as net income divided by book value of 
shareholder equity. Return on assets is calculated as earnings before interests and taxes 
(EBIT) divided by total assets. Both EBIT and total assets are retrieved from the Datastream 
database. 
Table 6: Firm value variables 
Variable Definition Measurement 
Q Tobin’s Q 
Log((Market value of equity + book value of assets – book 
value of equity – deferred tax) / book value of assets) 
Q’ Industry adjusted Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q – Industry median Tobin’s Q 
ROE Return on equity Net income /Book value of equity 
ROA Return on assets EBIT / Total assets 
 32 
4.4.5.2 Disclosure variables 
Environmental disclosure is our key independent variable of interest in the regressions. As 
mentioned in section 4.4.4, there have been several measures for non-financial disclosure in 
related literature. We use the carbon disclosure score from the Carbon Disclosure Project as 
a proxy for environmental disclosure.  
To test the value effect of the decision to disclose versus not to disclose, we use a dummy 
variable DISC. If the firm is included in the Disclosure sample the dummy equals one, zero 
otherwise. The environmental disclosure score, EDSCORE, equals the carbon disclosure 
score of the firm. All firm scores are listed in appendix 1. The change in disclosure score 
from one year to the next is the disclosure change score CHSCORE.  It is calculated as the 
disclosure score in year t minus the disclosure score in year t-1.  
In alternative specifications we use dummies representing which portfolio the firm is in. The 
level portfolios constructed in section 4.4.4.1 are dummy variables for disclosure level, and 
the change portfolios in section 4.4.4.2 are dummies for disclosure change.  
Table 7: Disclosure variables 
Variable Description Measurement 
DISC 
Dummy variable for disclosing 
firms 
Disclosing firms = 1, Non-disclosing firms = 0 
LEVEL_* 
Dummy variable for disclosure 
level portfolio 
Inclusion in High = LEVEL_1, Midrange = 
LEVEL_2, Low = LEVEL_3 
EDSCORE Environmental disclosure score Score on environmental disclosure index 
CHANGE_* 
Dummy variable for disclosure 
change portfolio 
Inclusion in Pos_Change = CHANGE_1, 
No_Change = CHANGE_2, Neg_Change = 
CHANGE_3 
CHSCORE Disclosure change score           –            
 
4.4.5.3  Control variables 
We include a series of independent variables to control for potential influences on firm 
value.  All control variables are retrieved directly from Datastream or easily calculated based 
on retrieved data. Following previous literature, all listed variables are in natural logarithms 
unless noted otherwise, to incorporate non-linear relations into our regression model.  
Fama and French (1992) find that size and book-to-market equity are associated with stock 
returns. They find firm size to be negatively associated with expected returns and book-to 
market to have a positive relation. Firm size has been addressed in different ways in previous 
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literature. Richardson and Welker (2001) use a dummy variable to test for size effects, where 
the dummy variable equal to one if the market value of company i at the end of year t is 
above the sample median and zero otherwise. Gompers et al. (2003) use market 
capitalization. Elsayed and Paton (2005) use the natural logarithm for total assets as a 
measure for firm size. We aim to test our hypothesis from an accounting perspective and 
choose to follow the logic of Elsayed and Paton (2005) and use the book value of total assets 
as a proxy for firm size.  
Book-to-market is defined as the ratio of book value of equity to the market value of equity. 
We retrieve the market-to-book ratio from Datastream, which is the balance sheet value of 
common equity divided by the market value of common equity. We calculate the book-to-
market variable by deriving the inverse market-to-book ratio.  
Fama and French (1992) find the level of debt to equity to be associated with returns. They 
suggest that the cost of equity increases with the degree of leverage. Leverage can also be 
considered a proxy for firm specific risk. Leftwich et al. (1981) propose that debt holders 
demand greater disclosure than equity holders and we therefor include a leverage variable to 
control for this effect. Leverage is the debt to equity ratio for firm i in year t, and is 
calculated by dividing book value of net debt by market value of shareholders equity. 
Leverage is not listed in natural logs because many observations have negative values. 
Differences in profitability might affect the valuation of the firm. We use return on equity to 
control for effects of firm profitability. ROE is described in more detail in section 4.4.5.1. 
Annual return on equity for the sample firms are retrieved from Datastream, and are not 
listed in logs. 
Table 8: Control variables 
Variable Description Measurement 
SIZE Firm size Log (Total assets) 
BM Book-to-market Log (1 /market-to-book) 
LEV Leverage ratio Book value net debt/market value of equity 
ROE Return on Equity Net profits/Book value of equity 
Y_YEAR Dummy variable year Use the first year of observations as reference year 
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4.4.6 Factor construction 
In the factor model regression, we use calculated benchmark factors as independent 
variables. Most related literature has retrieved these factors from the Kenneth French 
website
7
. The annual Fama/French European Factors are based on 15 European capital 
markets, including the four Nordic countries
8
. To get benchmark factors that match our exact 
sample selection, we construct our own Nordic factors. We base our calculations on the 
Nordic sample, described in section 4.4.3.  
4.4.6.1  RMRF  
The RMRF factor is the market return minus the risk free return, and is in literature 
described as the excess return on an aggregated market proxy (e.g. Carhart 1997). This factor 
captures firm-level exposure to the market. It is derived from the value-weighted return of all 
Nordic stocks minus risk free rate. The underlying population consists of firms from four 
capital market, and we choose to use the equal-weighted average of the risk free rates in the 
four countries as    in our calculations. We define the domestic risk free rate as the return on 
10 year government bonds. To obtain risk free rates for the four countries respectively, we 
retrieved monthly returns for 10 year government bonds from the national banks in each 
country
9
. The RMRF factor is then calculated as follows: 
             
Where    is the market return and    is the risk free rate. 
4.4.6.2  SMB and HML 
The SMB and HML factors are calculated based on returns of six portfolios. These are 
formed on size and book-to-market ratio and constructed at the end of each June. The 
median market equity divides the firms into two groups formed on size (Fama and French 
1993). Median market value of equity (M) of the Nordic sample is calculated based on 
market values retrieved from Datastream. Firms with market equity above median are 
                                                 
7 Benchmark factors are available on the Kenneth French website; 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html#Benchmarks 
8 The annual Fama/French European Factors include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
9 Information about interest rates and returns on government bonds are publicly available on the national banks websites; 
www.norges-bank.no, http://nationalbanken.dk, www.riksbank.se, http://www.suomenpankki.fi.  
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assigned to the big portfolio and firms with market equity below median are placed in the 
small portfolio.  
Three portfolios are based on the firms’ book-to-market ratio (Fama and French 1993). 
Book-to-market, BM, is calculated as the inverse fraction of the market-to-book value 
retrieved from Datastream. The Nordic sample is ranked according to their BM, and the 
population is then assigned to three groups based on this ranking. The 30 per cent with 
highest BM is assigned to the value portfolio, the 40 per cent mid-ranked firms are assigned 
to the neutral portfolio and the 30 per cent with lowest BM is assigned to the growth 
portfolio.  
The two parallel portfolio assignments are combined and the Nordic market is divided into 
six final portfolios, shown in Figure 1. The benchmark factors can be derived from monthly 
value-weighted average returns. Value-weighted returns are based on the total market 
capitalization, and calculated following the same method as described in section 4.3.1. 
Figure 1: SMB/HML Portfolios 
             Median M 
70th BM percentile Small Value Big Value 
 Small Neutral Big Neutral 
30th BM percentile Small Growth Big Growth 
 
 
The size factor is calculated as the average return of the three small portfolios minus the 
average return of the three big portfolios. The SMB factor is given by the following equation 
(Fama and French 1993)
10
:  
SMB = 1/3 (Small Value + Small Neutral + Small Growth) 
– 1/3 (Big Value + Big Neutral + Big Growth) 
 
                                                 
10 Kenneth French recently changed the way to divide the portfolios. We use his previous methodology in this factor 
construction.  
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The book-to-market benchmark factor is the average return on the two value portfolios 
minus the average return on the two growth portfolios (Fama and French 1993). The HML 
factor is calculated as following: 
HML = ½ (Small Value + Big Value) – ½ (Small Growth + Big Growth) 
4.4.6.3  MOM 
The momentum factor, MOM, is based on six portfolios formed on size and prior (2-12) 
return. These portfolios are calculated and adjusted monthly, in contrast to the annually 
calculated portfolios used for SMB and HML. As before, the median market equity of the 
Nordic firms functions as the size breakpoint. Firms with market cap above market median 
are in the big portfolio, and firms with market cap below market median are allocated to the 
small portfolio. 
The Nordic sample is assigned to three portfolios based on their prior returns. The monthly 
prior return breakpoint is the 70
th
 prior percentile and the 30
th
 prior percentile. Carhart 
(1997) define prior return as eleven-month returns lagged one month. For each firm the 11 
month prior return is calculated as growth in the return index from 12 months prior to 1 
month prior. For the first month, January 2007, the 11 month prior return refers to returns 
from the end of January 2006 to end of December 2006. We use the prior returns to rank the 
firms each month. We use this ranking to assign the firms into 3 portfolios where the 30 per 
cent with highest prior return is assigned to the up portfolio, the middle 40 per cent is 
assigned to medium portfolio, and the 30 per cent with lowest 11 month prior return is 
assigned to the down portfolio.  
The two parallel group assignments are used to divide the sample into 6 momentum 
portfolios, shown in Figure 2. For each of the six portfolios a monthly value-weighted return 
is calculated.  
Figure 2: MOM Portfolios 
                        Median M 
70th prior (2-12) percentile Small Up Big Up 
 Small Medium Big Medium 
30th prior (2-12) percentile Small Down Big Down 
 
 37 
The momentum factor is the equal-weighted average of the two portfolios with the highest 
30 per cent prior return portfolios minus the equal-weighted average of the two portfolios 
with the lowest 30 per cent prior return (Carhart 1997).  
MOM = ½ (Small Up + Big Up) – ½ (Small Down + Big Down) 
4.4.6.4 Descriptive statistics of Nordic factors 
To test the validity of our constructed factors, we examine the correlation between the 
Nordic factors and the European factors retrieved from the Kenneth French website. We do 
not assume a perfect correlation between the two sets of factors, but we should expect a 
certain degree of correlation between them. The correlation between European and Nordic 
factors is shown in Table 9. 
Table 9: Correlation between Nordic and European factors 
Factor RMRF SMB HML MOM 
Correlation with respective European factors 0.8428 0.5356 0.5990 -0.7872 
 
The three European factors of Fama and French (1993), SMB, HML, RMRF, are positively 
correlated with our constructed Nordic factors. This is in accordance with our expectations. 
The Nordic momentum factor has a strong negative correlation with the European 
momentum factor. The momentum effect shows the tendency of prior return to affect future 
returns. The negative correlation indicates that there are differences in effects of prior returns 
between the European countries and the Nordic countries. One possible explanation for this 
is that Nordic capital markets are more oil sensitive than the rest of the European capital 
markets. Another potential cause is that the financial crisis has had a different impact on the 
returns in the European sample, compared to the Nordic sample. The European sample 
includes countries that have been strongly affected by the financial turbulence: like Ireland, 
Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy. We cannot determine with certainty the reason we 
observe this negative correlation. Since the momentum factor behaves differently than 
expected, we choose to apply both the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) and the 
four-factor model of Carhart (1997) to control the quality of our results.  
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5. Empirical Analysis 
In this chapter, we present our empirical findings on the impact of voluntary environmental 
disclosure on firm value. Discussions and interpretations of the results are given in chapter 6.  
5.1 Summary statistics 
Table 10 presents summary statistics of the disclosure sample. We investigate correlations 
between the accounting and financial variables and environmental disclosure score, and 
compare mean values of the variables in extreme portfolios. When comparing only the 
extremes, we exclude Midrange and No_Change in order to isolate the effects of the extreme 
portfolios.  
The upper part of the table relates to firms divided into portfolios based on the absolute level 
of disclosure. Correlations between the EDSCORE and accounting measures are shown in 
the first column. We observe low and insignificant correlations for all variables except from 
LEV and M. LEV is negatively correlated while M is positively correlated with EDSCORE, 
both with statistical significance. When looking at the differences in means, we observe that 
majority of the measures have higher values in the High portfolio compared to the Low 
portfolio, but only M is statistically significant at a 1 per cent level. This indicates that the 
High portfolio consists of larger firms than Low portfolio. LEV has a negative difference; 
however, the difference is not statistically significant. 
The lower part of Table 10 presents the same analysis, but with portfolios based on the 
change in disclosure score. LEV, BM, and TA are positively correlated to CHSCORE, while 
there is a negative correlation with ROE, M, Tobin’s Q, and industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. 
These correlations are not statistical significant. Differences in means reveal some variances 
in firm characteristics of the Pos_Change and Neg_Change portfolios. The control variables 
LEV, BM, TA, and M all have higher means in the Pos_Change portfolio, while the firm 
value proxies ROE, Q and Q’ have lower mean values in this portfolio.  
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Assuming ROE and Q to be proxies for firm value, the summary statistics give an 
inconclusive indication of the association between firm value and environmental disclosure 
characteristics. In the next parts of the thesis, this will be thoroughly tested.  
Table 10: Summary statistics 
Level Portfolios 
 
Corr with 
EDSCORE 
Mean       
High 
Mean           
Low 
Difference 
LEV -0.087** 0.886 1.363 -0.478 
ROE 0.060 0.103 0.076 0.027 
BM 0.061 0.919 0.751 0.168 
M 0.180*** 58.6M 34.5M 24.1M*** 
TA 0.026 196M 157M 38.3M 
Q 0.052 1.545 1.475 0.070 
 Q’ 0.042 0.318 0.308 0.019 
Change portfolios 
 
Corr with 
CHSCORE 
Mean    
Pos_Change 
Mean      
Neg_Change 
Difference 
LEV 0.064 1.274 0.860 0.415 
ROE -0.051 0.089 0.107 -0.018 
BM 0.024 0.790 0.740 0.050 
M -0.053 45.6M 51.3M 5.73M 
TA 0.063 241M 165M 75.6M 
Q -0.016 1.542 1.606 -0.064 
 Q’ -0.014 0.360 0.411 -0.052 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the relationship of the level and change portfolios with several financial and accounting 
measures in the period 2007-2011. The first column gives the correlations for each of these variables with the EDSCORE and CHSCORE. 
The second and third columns give means for these variables within the extreme portfolios. The final column gives the difference of the 
two means. The description of the portfolio construction is given in section 4.4.4, EDSCORE, CHSCORE and all control variables are 
described in section 4.4.5. The significance of difference in means is a two-sided t-test with alternative hypothesis of difference not equal to 
zero (HA: diff != 0). Significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels is indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
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5.2 Pooled OLS regression 
In this section, we regress firm value on disclosure initiative, absolute disclosure level and 
disclosure change.  
5.2.1 Effect of disclosure initiative on firm value 
We start by doing a preliminary test of our main hypothesis H and examine whether the 
initiative to voluntarily disclose environmental information has an effect on firm value. We 
use the entire Nordic sample and indicate the disclosure initiative with a dummy variable. 
The dummy variable equals one if the firm reports environmental information, zero 
otherwise. We use Tobin’s Q as proxy for firm value and do a robust pooled OLS regression. 
To test the validity of the results we test for alternative measures of firm performance. We 
do additional regressions with industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q, return on equity and return on 
assets as alternative proxies for firm value. The results for all four regressions are listed in 
Table 11.  
When applying the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q as dependent variable, disclosure 
initiative has a positive and significant coefficient of 0.084 within a 99 per cent confidence 
interval. The R
2
 is 0.775 which means that the independent variables explain a large portion 
of the variation in the dependent variable. This implies that, all other control variables held 
constant, disclosing firms have 8.4 per cent higher Tobin’s Q than non-disclosing firms. 
However, when comparing firms in the disclosure sample to the rest of the Nordic sample, 
the results are potentially biased due to the endogeneity problem. Since the decision to 
disclose is voluntary, the effect of disclosure on firm value is very likely to be overestimated. 
In the alternative regressions, we observe a change in the direction of the impact when 
modeling for operating performance compared to financial performance. Disclosure 
initiative has a significant positive effect on industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q, similar to the 
findings for Tobin’s Q. When we use operating measures as proxy for firm value, we find a 
significant negative effect of disclosure on both ROE and ROA. The R
2
s for the alternative 
models are low which indicate that alternative models do not explain the variation in firm 
value as well as when modeling for Tobin’s Q. As before, the results are potentially biased 
due to endogeneity.  
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Table 11: Pooled OLS on disclosure initiative in Nordic sample 
Dependent variable: Q Q’ ROE ROA 
DISC 
0.084*** 
(0.016) 
0.191*** 
(0.073) 
-0.280** 
(0.141) 
-0.083*** 
(0.013) 
Q - - 
0.892 
(0.719) 
-0.076** 
(0.039) 
SIZE 
-0.040*** 
(0.005) 
-0.113*** 
(0.025) 
0.249*** 
(0.077) 
0.052*** 
(0.007) 
LEV 
-0.010** 
(0.006) 
-0.026 
(0.024) 
-0.317** 
(0.127) 
-0.013*** 
(0.003) 
BM 
-0.511*** 
(0.013) 
-1.155*** 
(0.083) 
0.720 
(0.527) 
-0.057*** 
(0.015) 
ROE 
0.022** 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.067) 
- - 
Y_2008 
-0.022 
(0.019) 
0.565*** 
(0.082) 
-0.325* 
(0.120) 
-0.035** 
(0.016) 
Y_2009 
-0.017 
(0.017) 
0.314*** 
(0.084) 
-0.212*** 
(0.079) 
-0.057*** 
(0.013) 
Y_2010 
-0.006 
(0.016) 
0.262*** 
(0.100) 
-0.285** 
(0.117) 
-0.040*** 
(0.014) 
Y_2011 
-0.002 
(0.020) 
0.520*** 
(0.120) 
-0.280** 
(0.112) 
-0.095 
(0.059) 
_cons 
0.650*** 
(0.067) 
1.140*** 
(0.355) 
-3.149*** 
(0.974) 
-0.675*** 
(0.093) 
R
2
 0.775 0.362 0.212 0.027 
N 2612 2612 2612 2612 
The first column presents the coefficients from regressions of Tobin’s Q on DISC and control variables. The second column lists the 
coefficients when regressing industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. Column thee shows the regression coefficients with ROE as dependent variable 
and the fourth column presents the results when regressing ROA on DISC and control variables. To analyze the panel data with OLS, we 
pool the cross-sections over time by including dummy variables Y_2008 – Y2011, and choose 2007 as base year. All other variables are 
described in section 4.4.5. Significance at a 10, 5 and 1 per cent level is indicated as *, ** and *** respectively. We use the White 
correction to deal with potential heteroscedasticity. 
5.2.2 Effects of disclosure level on firm value 
We test our hypothesis H_I and analyze the relationship between voluntary environmental 
disclosure and firm value, given by accounting measures. The null hypothesis predicts that 
there is no association between disclosed environmental information and the value of the 
firm. In this section, we investigate the effect of absolute disclosure level, and base the 
disclosure variables on EDSCORE and level portfolios. 
5.2.2.1 Effect on Tobin’s Q 
The results from the robust pooled OLS regression of Tobin’s Q are listed in the first column 
of Table 12. EDSCORE is the disclosure variable and size, leverage, book-to-market ratio, 
and return on equity are included as control variables. We find that the level of 
environmental disclosure has a positive coefficient of 0.001, significant at a 5 per cent level. 
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This indicates that a firm with 10 points higher disclosure score than comparable firms has 
an approximately 1 per cent higher Tobin’s Q ratio, all other variables held constant. 
Table 12: Pooled OLS on disclosure level  
  Portfolios Only extreme 
Dependent variable: Q Q Q 
EDSCORE 
0.001** 
(0.000) 
- - 
LEVEL_1 - 
0.018 
(0.023) 
0.052** 
(0.025) 
LEVEL_3 - 
-0.038* 
(0.022) 
- 
SIZE 
-0.018** 
(0.009) 
-0.017** 
(0.009) 
-0.018* 
(0.010) 
LEV 
0.001 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
BM 
-0.548*** 
(0.027) 
-0.549*** 
(0.027) 
-0.530*** 
(0.034) 
ROE 
-0.180*** 
(0.054) 
-0.178*** 
(0.055) 
-0.029 
(0.046) 
Y_2008 
0.035 
(0.037) 
0.036 
(0.037) 
0.063 
(0.053) 
Y_2009 
-0.017 
(0.032) 
-0.008 
(0.032) 
0.004 
(0.040) 
Y_2010 
-0.007 
(0.032) 
0.009 
(0.032) 
0.011 
(0.043) 
Y_2011 
-0.009 
(0.032) 
0.012 
(0.032) 
0.013 
(0.044) 
_cons 
0.273* 
(0.157) 
0.323* 
(0.167) 
0.295 
(0.189) 
R
2
 0.814 0.814 0.814 
N 506 506 308 
The first column presents the coefficients from regressions of Tobin’s Q on EDSCORE and control variables. The second column shows 
coefficients when regressing Tobin’s Q on portfolio inclusion in High and Low portfolios as disclosure level dummy variables (LEVEL_1 
and LEVEL_3) and control variables. The third column restricts the sample to firms in the High and Low portfolios and the regression 
include a dummy variable for the High Portfolio (LEVEL_1) and the controls variables. To analyze the panel data with OLS we pool the 
cross-sections over time by including dummy variables Y_2008 – Y2011, and choose 2007 as base year. All variables are describes in 
section 4.4.5. Significance at a 10, 5 and 1 per cent level is indicated as *, ** and *** respectively. We use the White correction to deal 
with potential heteroscedasticity. 
 
5.2.2.2 Alternative measures for disclosure level 
In addition to the disclosure score, we use the portfolio construction from section 4.4.4 as an 
alternative measure of disclosure level. First, we use dummies for inclusion in the High or 
Low portfolio. The results are listed in the middle column in Table 12. We find that inclusion 
in High has a coefficient of 0.018 and inclusion in Low has a negative coefficient of 0.038. 
The High portfolio coefficient is not significant, while the Low portfolio coefficient is 
significant at a 10 per cent level.    
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Next, we follow the method of Gompers et al. (2003) and exclude the Midrange portfolio 
from the sample, and use a dummy for inclusion in the High portfolio as disclosure variable. 
We do this to isolate the effects of the extreme portfolios. This restriction reduces the sample 
to 308 observations. The results are listed in the right column of Table 12, and are consistent 
with previous findings. We find a positive effect of inclusion in the High portfolio. The 
coefficient of the disclosure variable is 0.052, significant within a 95 per cent confidence 
interval. This implies that firms in High have a 5.2 per cent higher Tobin’s Q than firms in 
the Low portfolio.  
5.2.2.3 Modeling with different proxies for firm value 
We change the previous specification with three alternative measures of firm value as 
dependent variables. In separate regressions for each measure we use disclosure score or 
portfolio dummy as key independent variable. The results of these six regressions are listed 
in Table 13. First, we adjust for industry differences and regress with industry-adjusted 
Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. The coefficient for environmental disclosure score is 
positive, but not significant, at 0.002. The portfolio dummy with a coefficient of 0.048, show 
the same indication, but it is still insignificant. Next, we use the operating performance 
measures ROE and ROA as dependent variables. The disclosure variable EDSCORE has a 
significant, positive effect of 0.002 at a 5 per cent significance level on ROE, and an 
insignificant, and slightly positive effect on ROA. The latter coefficient is approximately 
zero. When comparing the High with the Low portfolio, both ROE and ROA is greater in 
High, but the coefficients are not significant. The R
2
 for these regressions is relatively low, 
and indicate a lower degree of explanation compared to the main model. 
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Table 13: Disclosure level - Alternative proxies for firm value 
Dependent 
variable 
Q’ ROE ROA 
Full 
sample 
Only  
extremes 
Full 
sample 
Only  
extremes 
Full 
sample 
Only  
extremes 
EDSCORE 
0.002 
(0.002)  
0.002** 
(0.001) 
 
0.000 
 (0.000) 
- 
LEVEL_1 - 
0.048 
(0.089) 
- 
0.018 
(0.025) 
- 
0.002 
(0.014) 
Q - - 
-0.259** 
(0.115) 
-0.033 
(0.050) 
0.115*** 
(0.115) 
0.101*** 
(0.031) 
SIZE 
0.000 
(0.028) 
0.004 
(0.037) 
-0.002 
(0.013) 
0.025*** 
(0.010) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.014*** 
(0.005) 
LEV 
0.004 
(0.13) 
0.002 
(0.016) 
0.020* 
(0.115) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
BM 
-0.872*** 
(0.089) 
-0.874*** 
(0.118) 
-0.346*** 
(0.092) 
-0.150*** 
(0.031) 
-0.014 
(0.010) 
-0.016 
(0.014) 
ROE 
-0.100 
(0.112) 
0.157 
(0.170) 
- - - - 
Y_2008 
0.410*** 
(0.122) 
0.596*** 
(0.185) 
-0.001 
(0.045) 
-0.081* 
(0.046) 
-0.021 
(0.020) 
-0.021 
(0.026) 
Y_2009 
0.114 
(0.124) 
0.225 
(0.166) 
-0.075* 
(0.044) 
-0.100*** 
(0.032) 
-0.027** 
(0.012) 
-0.015 
(0.014) 
Y_2010 
0.067 
(0.127) 
0.228 
(0.182) 
-0.082** 
(0.033) 
-0.071*** 
(0.032) 
-0.023** 
(0.011) 
-0.015 
(0.013) 
Y_2011 
0.239* 
(0.125) 
0.430** 
(0.184) 
-0.054 
(0.036) 
-0.055* 
(0.032) 
-0.011 
(0.012) 
-0.001 
(0.012) 
_cons 
-0.426 
(0.495) 
-0.553 
(0.679) 
-0.028 
(0.884) 
-0.361** 
(0.167) 
-0.173*** 
(0.065) 
-0.200** 
(0.085) 
R
2
 0.500 0.489 0.365 0.225 0.289 0.254 
N 506 308 506 308 506 308 
The first column presents the coefficients from regressions of industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q on EDSCORE and control variables. . First, the 
full disclosure sample is used and EDSCORE is the disclosure variable. Then, the sample is restricted to only the extreme portfolios, and 
the disclosure variable is the dummy for inclusion in High. Column two shows the regression coefficients with ROE as dependent variable 
and the third column presents the results when regressing ROA on EDSCORE and control variables. The same two alternative samples are 
used for these two regressions and marked as Full sample and Only Extremes. To analyze the panel data with OLS we pool the cross-
sections over time by including dummy variables Y_2008 – Y2011, and choose 2007 as base year. All variables are described in section 
4.4.5. Significance at a 10, 5 and 1 per cent level is indicated as *, ** and *** respectively. We use the White correction to deal with 
potential heteroscedasticity. 
 
5.2.2.4 Summary of findings 
Overall, the results of looking at the effect of disclosure level on firm value suggest a 
positive relation. The absolute level of environmental disclosure has a positive association 
with firm value, measured as Tobin’s Q. The models with alternative proxies for firm value, 
although less significant, suggest the same positive association as the original model.  
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5.2.3 Effects of changes in disclosure on firm value 
We want to investigate whether an improvement or aggravation in environmental disclosure 
score from year t-1 to year t has an effect on firm value. Tobin’s Q remains our main proxy 
for firm value, and the disclosure variables are CHSCORE and change portfolios. We test 
the robustness of the results by looking at alternative measures. 
5.2.3.1 Tobin’s Q as proxy for firm value 
When calculating the disclosure change scores CHSCORE, we lose one year of observations 
for each firm. This implies that there are no observations for 2007, and we use 2008 as 
reference year for the year dummies. We use robust pooled OLS regression on Tobin’s Q 
and the results are listed in the first column in Table 14. The coefficient of the disclosure 
variable is insignificant and approximately zero. The low and insignificant coefficient for 
disclosure change implies that improvement or aggravation in environmental disclosure 
score has no statistically documented effect on firm value.  
Table 14: Pooled OLS on disclosure change  
  Portfolios Only extreme 
Dependent variable: Q Q Q 
CHSCORE 
0.000 
(0.000) 
- - 
CHANGE_1 - 
-0.001 
(0.027) 
0.009 
(0.025) 
CHANGE_3 - 
0.000 
(0.029) 
- 
SIZE 
-0.023** 
(0.011) 
-0.022** 
(0.011) 
-0.023** 
(0.010) 
LEV 
0.007 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
BM 
-0.537*** 
(0.035) 
-0.537*** 
(0.034) 
-0.553*** 
(0.033) 
ROE 
-0.142* 
(0.074) 
-0.142* 
(0.073) 
0.079* 
(0.046) 
Y_2009 
-0.040 
(0.035) 
-0.040 
(0.035) 
-0.045 
(0.039) 
Y_2010 
-0.021 
(0.035) 
-0.021 
(0.036) 
-0.059 
(0.043) 
Y_2011 
-0.014 
(0.037) 
-0.014 
(0.036) 
-0.074* 
(0.040) 
_cons 
0.439** 
(0.192) 
0.439** 
(0.195) 
0.443** 
(0.180) 
R
2
 0.805 0.805 0.837 
N 349 349 243 
The first column presents the coefficients from regressions of Tobin’s Q on CHSCORE and control variables. The second column shows 
coefficients when regressing Tobin’s Q on portfolio inclusion in Pos_Change and Neg_Change portfolios as disclosure level dummy 
variables (CHANGE_1 and CHANGE_3) and control variables. The third column restricts the sample to firms in the Pos_Change and 
Neg_Change portfolios and the regression include a dummy variable for the Pos_Change Portfolio (CHANGE_1) and the controls 
variables. We include dummy variables Y_2009 – Y2011, and choose 2008 as base year. All variables are described in section 4.4.5. 
Significance at a 10, 5 and 1 per cent level is indicated as *, ** and *** respectively. We use the White correction to deal with potential 
heteroscedasticity. 
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5.2.3.2 Alternative measures for disclosure change 
We apply alternative measures for disclosure change to test the validity of our previous 
results. First, we use inclusion in disclosure change portfolios as dummy variables in the 
regression. The results are shown in column two in Table 14. The coefficients are very low 
and insignificant for both the Pos_Change and Neg_Change portfolio. This implies that we 
find no evidence of firms included in neither the improvement nor the aggravation portfolio 
to have a significantly higher or lower Tobin’s Q that the firms with a stable disclosure 
score, ceteris paribus.  
Last, we restrict the sample to only include the two extreme portfolios, Pos_Change and 
Neg_Change. The third column in Table 14 shows the regression output with Q as dependent 
variable, the dummy variable for the Pos_Change and the control variables. The 
Pos_Change dummy variable has a positive, but insignificant coefficient of 0.009. The R
2
 
for the model is 0.837 and the number of observations is reduced to 243. 
5.2.3.3 Modeling with different proxies for firm value 
We test the robustness of the results by modeling with alternative measures for firm value. 
The regression output is listed in Table 15. The R
2
s are lower, and the models explain less of 
the variation in the firm value measure, than when regressing Tobin’s Q. With industry-
adjusted Q as dependent variable, the coefficient for disclosure change is the same as for Q; 
both insignificant and approximately zero. When analyzing only the extreme portfolios, we 
find no significant coefficient of inclusion in the Pos_Change portfolio. This supports the 
previous finding that improvements or aggravations in disclosure score have no effect on 
firm value.  
When we apply operating performance measures as dependent variable, the coefficients for 
disclosure change are negative. With ROE as dependent variable, CHSCORE has an 
insignificant coefficient of -0.001. When restricting the sample to only the extremes, the 
dummy for inclusion in Pos_Change has a negative, insignificant coefficient. When 
regressing ROA, the coefficient of CHSCORE is significant at -0.001. The same is indicated 
in the extreme comparison where the dummy has a significant coefficient of -0.027. Both are 
significant at a 5 per cent level. This implies that an effort to improve the firms’ 
environmental disclosure has a negative impact on operating performance.  
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Table 15: Disclosure change - Alternative proxies for firm value 
Dependent 
variable: 
Q’ ROE ROA 
Full 
sample 
Only  
extremes 
Full 
sample 
Only  
extremes 
Full 
sample 
Only  
extremes 
CHSCORE 
0.000 
(0.002) 
- 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
- 
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
- 
CHANGE_1 - 
0.015 
(0.085) 
- 
-0.018 
(0.027) 
- 
-0.027** 
(0.014) 
Q - - 
-0.197 
(0.147) 
0.082* 
(0.049) 
0.135*** 
(0.020) 
0.179*** 
(0.025) 
SIZE 
-0.010 
(0.033) 
-0.020 
(0.034) 
0.012 
(0.017) 
0.028** 
(0.011) 
0.017*** 
(0.004) 
0.015*** 
(0.005) 
LEV 
0.011 
(0.014) 
0.014 
(0.016) 
0.017 
(0.013) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
BM 
-0.832*** 
(0.100) 
-0.866*** 
(0.105) 
-0.319*** 
(0.118) 
-0.086*** 
(0.027) 
-0.011 
(0.010) 
0.027 
(0.014) 
ROE 
0.022 
(0.145) 
0.453*** 
(0.172) 
- - - - 
Y2009 
-0.226** 
(0.098) 
-0.238** 
(0.118) 
-0.048 
(0.043) 
-0.038 
(0.042) 
-0.006 
(0.021) 
-0.000 
(0.026) 
Y2010 
-0.275*** 
(0.102) 
-0.342** 
(0.140) 
-0.055 
(0.045) 
0.020 
(0.041) 
-0.006 
(0.020) 
0.013 
(0.026) 
Y2011 
-0.098 
(0.101) 
-0.262** 
(0.121) 
-0.018 
(0.040) 
0.006 
(0.045) 
0.011 
(0.020) 
0.020 
(0.026) 
_cons 
0.242 
(0.577) 
0.396 
(0.618) 
-0.185 
(0.282) 
-0.442** 
(0.205) 
-0.256*** 
(0.070) 
-0.229*** 
(0.088) 
R
2 
0.521 0.552 0.336 0.211 0.372 0.341 
N 349 243 349 243 349 243 
The first column presents the coefficients from regressions of industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q on CHSCORE and control variables. . First, the 
full disclosure sample is used and CHSCORE is the disclosure variable. Then, the sample is restricted to only the extreme portfolios, and 
the disclosure variable is the dummy for inclusion in Pos_Change. Column two shows the regression coefficients with ROE as dependent 
variable and the third column presents the results when regressing ROA on CHSCORE and control variables. The same two alternative 
samples are used for these two regressions and marked as Full sample and Only Extremes. To analyze the panel data with OLS we pool the 
cross-sections over time by including dummy variables Y_2009 – Y2011, and choose 2008 as base year. All variables are described in 
section 4.4.5. Significance at a 10, 5 and 1 per cent level is indicated as *, ** and *** respectively. We use the White correction to deal 
with potential heteroscedasticity. 
 
5.2.3.4 Summary of findings 
The direction of the effect of disclosure change depends on the proxy for firm value. The 
effect of disclosure change is approximately zero on financial performance measures, but we 
observe a negative effect on operating measures. Only the impact on ROA is statistically 
significant. However, the goodness of fit for the models with alternative firm value proxies is 
poorer than for the main model with Tobin’s Q. Reasons for this could be that the variables 
are difficult to predict, or an omitted variable scenario. In the latter case, the estimates are 
biased.  
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5.3 Fixed effects regression 
Our analysis is based on panel data, which may result in residuals that are correlated across 
firms or time leading to bias in OLS standard errors (Woolridge 2009). To control for this, 
we validate our analysis by using the panel data method of fixed effects. 
5.3.1 Fixed effects on absolute disclosure level 
The results from the fixed effects regression on Tobin’s Q are listed in the left column of 
Table 16. We find the coefficient for the disclosure variable to be positive at 0.001 and 
significant within a 95 per cent confidence interval. The model has a coefficient of 
determination of 0.737. These findings are in line with the findings of the pooled OLS 
regression, and imply a positive association between environmental disclosure level and firm 
value.   
Table 16: Fixed effects of disclosure level 
  Portfolios Only extreme 
Dependent variable: Q Q Q 
EDSCORE 
0.001** 
(0.000) 
- - 
LEVEL_1 - 
0.016 
(0.014) 
0.057** 
(0.022) 
LEVEL_3 - 
-0.016 
(0.015) 
- 
SIZE 
-0.199*** 
(0.042) 
-0.195*** 
(0.042) 
-0.171*** 
(0.064) 
LEV 
0.008 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
0.010 
(0.014) 
BM 
-0.406*** 
(0.016) 
-0.406*** 
(0.016) 
-0.432*** 
(0.022) 
ROE 
0.005 
(0.031) 
0.001 
(0.031) 
0.032 
(0.040) 
_cons 
3.470 
(0.725) 
3.460 
(0.729) 
2.99*** 
(1.11) 
R
2  
(within) 0.737 0.735 0.753 
N 506 506 308 
The first column presents the coefficients from FE regressions of Tobin’s Q on EDSCORE and control variables. The second column 
shows coefficients when regressing Tobin’s Q on portfolio inclusion in High and Low portfolios as disclosure level dummy variables 
(LEVEL_1 and LEVEL_3) and control variables. The third column restricts the sample to firms in the High and Low portfolios and the 
regression include a dummy variable for the High Portfolio (LEVEL_1) and the controls variables. All variables are described in section 
4.4.5. Significance at a 10, 5 and 1 per cent level is indicated as *, ** and *** respectively. We use the White correction to deal with 
potential heteroscedasticity. 
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We apply alternative measures for disclosure level, and the results are shown in the second 
and third column of Table 16. Under fixed effects, we find that inclusion in the High 
portfolio has a positive coefficient of 0.016 and inclusion in the Low portfolio has a negative 
coefficient of 0.016. The results are not significant, but consistent with the findings of the 
OLS regression. 
When excluding the Midrange portfolio from the sample, the High portfolio coefficient is 
significant within a 95 per cent confidence interval with a value of 0.057. This implies that a 
firm in the High portfolio has a 5.7 per cent higher Tobin’s Q than a firm in Low portfolio. 
The results for the alternative measures of disclosure level are in line with the findings from 
the pooled OLS regression model.   
5.3.1.1 Modeling for alternative proxies of firm value 
As in the pooled OLS regression model, we apply three alternative dependent variables. 
Results are displayed in Table 17. When using industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q as dependent 
variable, we find a positive and insignificant coefficient of 0.001 on EDSCORE. The dummy 
variable for inclusion in the High portfolio is also positive, but insignificant. This is in line 
with previous results. 
Under fixed effects, we find that disclosure level has a significant negative effect on 
operating measures when using EDSCORE as key independent variable. The variable has a 
coefficient of -0.001 for both ROE and ROA, and the results are significant at a 10 and 5 per 
cent significance level respectively. The regressions with only High and Low portfolios 
indicate the same negative association, but are statistically insignificant. The findings 
indicate a negative association between the operating performance measures and level of 
disclosure, and are contradictory to previous findings.  
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Table 17: Fixed effects of disclosure level on alternative value proxies 
Dependent 
variable: 
Q’ ROE ROA 
Full 
sample 
Only 
extreme 
Full 
sample 
Only 
extreme 
Full 
sample 
Only 
extreme 
EDSCORE 
0.001 
(0.001) 
- 
-0.001* 
(0.001) 
- 
-0.001** 
(0.001) 
- 
LEVEL_1 - 
0.068 
(0.084) 
- 
-0.052 
(0.042) 
- 
-0.021 
(0.022) 
Q - - 
0.015 
(0.091) 
0.114 
(0.143) 
0.070 
(0.045) 
0.009 
(0.060) 
SIZE 
-0.097 
(0.143) 
0.101 
(0.244) 
0.440*** 
(0.070) 
0.599*** 
(0.114) 
0.209*** 
(0.034) 
0.240*** 
(0.060) 
LEV 
0.015 
(0.031) 
0.031 
(0.053) 
0.017 
(0.016) 
0.010 
(0.026) 
-0.012 
(0.008) 
-0.011 
(0.014) 
BM 
-0.505*** 
(0.054) 
-0.580*** 
(0.083) 
-0.174*** 
(0.045) 
-0.122 
(0.074) 
-0.029 
(0.022) 
-0.061 
(0.039) 
ROE 
-0.006 
(0.106) 
-0.072 
(0.154) 
- - - - 
_cons 
1.640 
(2.483) 
-1.795 
(4.236) 
-7.561*** 
(1.216) 
-10.392*** 
(1.983) 
-3.532 
(0.601) 
-4.114 
(1.044) 
R
2 
(within) 0.251 0.243 0.178 0.195 0.125 0.118 
N 506 308 506 308 506 308 
The first column presents the coefficients from FE regressions of industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q on the disclosure variable and control 
variables. First, the full disclosure sample is used and EDSCORE is the disclosure variable. Then, the sample is restricted to only the 
extreme portfolios, and the disclosure variable is the dummy for inclusion in High. Column two shows the regression coefficients with 
ROE as dependent variable and the third column presents the results when regressing ROA on EDSCORE and control variables. The same 
two alternative samples are used for these two regressions and marked as Full sample and Only Extremes.  All variables are described in 
section 4.4.5. Significance at a 10, 5 and 1 per cent level is indicated as *, ** and *** respectively. We use the White correction to deal 
with potential heteroscedasticity. 
5.3.1.2 Summary of findings 
The fixed effects regressions on financial performance measures show results consistent with 
the findings in the pooled regression. The results with operating measures as proxies for firm 
value indicate an opposite direction of the effects than under pooled OLS. However, the 
coefficients of determination indicate a poor fit for these models. 
5.3.2 Fixed effects on disclosure changes 
Similar to the procedures in the pooled OLS regression, we employ the disclosure change 
score as key independent variable to capture the potential effect of change in environmental 
disclosure level from year t-1 to year t. The regression output is listed in column one in 
Table 18. The disclosure variable, CHSCORE, has a statistically insignificant coefficient of 
approximately zero.  This result is in accordance with the results from the OLS regression, 
and supports the finding that improvement or aggravation in disclosure score has very little 
effect on firm value, measured as Tobin’s Q.  
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Table 18: Fixed effects on disclosure change 
  Portfolios Only extreme 
Dependent variable: Q Q Q 
CHSCORE 
0.000 
(0.000) 
- - 
CHANGE_1 - 
-0.004 
(0.014) 
0.004 
(0.014) 
CHANGE_3 - 
-0.003 
(0.016) 
- 
SIZE 
-0.274*** 
(0.062) 
-0.274*** 
(0.062) 
-0.172* 
(0.089) 
LEV 
0.031*** 
(0.011) 
0.031*** 
(0.011) 
0.040*** 
(0.015) 
BM 
-0.370*** 
(0.019) 
-0.370*** 
(0.019) 
-0.417*** 
(0.025) 
ROE 
0.001 
(0.034) 
0.005 
(0.034) 
0.054 
(0.046) 
_cons 
4.86*** 
(1.085) 
4.861*** 
(1.090) 
3.034* 
(1.549) 
R
2  
(within) 0.684 0.684 0.744 
N 349 349 243 
The first column presents the coefficients from FE regressions of Tobin’s Q on CHSCORE and control variables. The second column 
shows coefficients when regressing Tobin’s Q on portfolio inclusion in Pos_Change and Neg_Change portfolios as disclosure level 
dummy variables (CHANGE_1 and CHANGE_3) and control variables. The third column restricts the sample to the extreme portfolios and 
the regression includes a dummy variable for the Pos_Change portfolio (CHANGE_1) and the controls variables. All variables are 
described in section 4.4.5. Significance at a 10, 5 and 1 per cent level is indicated as *, ** and *** respectively. We use the White 
correction to deal with potential heteroscedasticity. 
 
We employ different measures for disclosure change to validate our findings, and the results 
are listed in Table 18. Column two shows the regression output when using portfolio 
dummies as disclosure variables. The results show that both the Pos_Change and 
Neg_Change dummies have negative, but insignificant coefficients of -0.004 and -0.003 
respectively. When only including firms within the two extreme portfolios in the regression 
sample, the Pos_Change dummy has a positive and insignificant coefficient of 0.004.  These 
findings are in line with the findings with OLS regression.  
5.3.2.1 Modeling with different proxies for firm value 
We model for alternative proxies for firm value and the results are listed in Table 19. The 
alternative models give a CHSCORE coefficient of -0.001 for all the value proxies when 
applying the full disclosure sample. The coefficients are statistically insignificant with 
industry-adjusted Q and ROE as dependent variable. With ROA as the dependent variable, 
the coefficient is significant at a 5 per cent significance level. When we restrict the sample to 
only include the extreme portfolios, the dummy variable for inclusion in Pos_Change is 
negative for all three firm value proxies. For industry-adjusted Q, the disclosure variable has 
an insignificant variable of -0.032. ROE has a significant disclosure coefficient of -0.047 at a 
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10 per cent level, and ROA has a significant coefficient of -0.034 at a 5 per cent level.  These 
results are in accordance with the results of the pooled OLS regression. The R
2
s are very low 
and imply that the models explain very little of the observed variation in the dependent 
variable.  
Table 19: Fixed effects of disclosure change on alternative value proxies  
Dependent 
variable 
Q’ ROE ROA 
Full 
sample 
Only 
extremes 
Full 
sample 
Only 
extremes 
Full 
sample 
Only 
extremes 
CHSCORE 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
- 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
- 
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
- 
CHANGE_1 - 
-0.032 
(0.044) 
- 
-0.047* 
(0.026) 
- 
-0.034** 
(0.016) 
Q - - 
0.020 
(0.129) 
0.196 
(0.168) 
0.086 
(0.061) 
0.131 
(0.101) 
SIZE 
-0.056 
(0.186) 
0.230 
(0.285) 
0.624*** 
(0.119) 
1.012*** 
(0.147) 
0.318*** 
(0.056) 
0.468*** 
(0.088) 
LEV 
0.045 
(0.032) 
0.066 
(0.048) 
0.017 
(0.021) 
-0.041 
(0.029) 
-0.008 
(0.010) 
-0.022 
(0.017) 
BM 
-0.434*** 
(0.057) 
-0.526*** 
(0.081) 
-0.135** 
(0.060) 
-0.045 
(0.085) 
-0.018 
(0.028) 
-0.020 
(0.051) 
ROE 
0.042 
(0.102) 
-0.033 
(0.148) 
- - - - 
_cons 
1.042 
(3.253) 
-3.997 
(4.981) 
-10.901*** 
(2.081) 
-17.584*** 
(2.567) 
-5.505*** 
(0.976) 
-8.104*** 
(1.539) 
R
2 
0.227 0.266 0.150 0.282 0.148 0.209 
N 349 243 349 243 349 243 
The first column presents the coefficients from FE regressions of industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q on the disclosure variable and control 
variables. First, the full disclosure sample is used and CHSCORE is the disclosure variable. Then, the sample is restricted to only the 
extreme portfolios, and the disclosure variable is the dummy for inclusion in Pos_Change. Column two shows the regression coefficients 
with ROE as dependent variable and the third column presents the results when regressing ROA on CHSCORE and control variables. The 
same two alternative samples are used for these two regressions and marked as Full sample and Only Extremes.  All variables are described 
in section 4.4.5. Significance at a 10, 5 and 1 per cent level is indicated as *, ** and *** respectively. 
5.3.2.2 Summary of findings 
The results from the fixed effects regressions on disclosure change are consistent with the 
results we found in the pooled OLS regression. We cannot document any significant effect 
on financial performance measures and we find indications of a negative effect of disclosure 
change on operating measures. The R
2
 for the alternative models, is however very low and 
indicates a poor fit for these models. Overall, our findings suggest that improvements or 
aggravations in the level of disclosed environmental information has no statistically 
significant impact on firm value. 
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5.4 Portfolio returns 
5.4.1 Disclosure level portfolios 
We calculate both the value-weighted and equal-weighted portfolio returns for each period t, 
following the method described in section 4.3.1.  
Figure 3 shows the value-weighted returns over the 5-year time period. By investing NOK 
1000 in the High portfolio at the beginning of 2007, the investment grows to NOK 1370.7 by 
November 31, 2011. This equals a value-weighted return of 37.1 per cent over the 5-year 
period, and an annualized return of 7.4 per cent. A similar investment in the Midrange 
portfolio yields a value-weighted 5-year return of 62.1 per cent and 0.1 per cent for the Low 
portfolio. These results show that High outperforms Low, but an investment in the Midrange 
portfolio yields the best return over the 5-year period. 
Figure 3: Value-weighted returns of level portfolios 
 
Figure 4 shows the equal-weighted portfolio returns. By investing NOK 1000 in the High 
portfolio at the beginning of 2007, the investment has declined to NOK 887.2 by the end of 
November 2011. This constitutes a return of – 11.4 per cent over the 5-year period, and an 
annualized return of – 2.3 per cent.  For the Midrange portfolio the 5-year investment yields 
a return of 5.3 per cent, or an annualized return of 1.1 per cent.  An investment in the Low 
portfolio gives a 5-year return of – 20.5 per cent, and an annualized return of – 4.1 per cent.  
  
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
High
Midrange
Low
 54 
Figure 4: Equal-weighted returns of level portfolios 
 
The portfolio growth patterns follow the same trend for both value-weighted and equal-
weighted returns, and we observe differences in portfolio returns. The Midrange portfolio 
outperforms the High and Low portfolios, and High yields a higher return than Low. When 
calculating equal-weighted returns, the returns of small firms in the portfolio are given 
greater weighting than under value-weighted return calculation. As we observed in the 
summary statistics, the size differences between High and Low are statistically significant, 
which implies that the High portfolio consists of larger companies than the Low portfolio. 
The differences between the value-weighted and equal-weighted returns for our portfolios 
suggest that the larger firms in the sample yields relatively higher returns than the smaller 
firms. We will use both value-weighted and equal-weighted returns in the following analysis. 
5.4.2 Disclosure change portfolios 
We examine the differences in returns between the disclosure change portfolios. We also 
observe disparities in returns using this portfolio construction, but the differences are 
distributed differently than with level portfolios. By investing NOK 1000 in the Pos_Change 
portfolio at the beginning of 2008, the investment grows to NOK 1473.7 by November 31, 
2011. This equals a value-weighted return of 47.4 per cent over the 4-year period, and an 
annualized return of 9.5 per cent. A similar investment in the No_Change portfolio gives a 
value-weighted 4-year return of 14.4 per cent, equal to 2.9 per cent annualized. The 
Neg_Change portfolio yields a 4-year return of 5.3 per cent, which means an annualized 
return of 1.1 per cent.  
Pos_Change outperforms the two other portfolios and gives the best return over the 4-year 
period. The No_Change portfolio yields a better return than the Neg_Change portfolio. This 
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implies that investing in firms that improve their disclosure score by more than five points 
from one year to the next yields a better return than investing in firms with a fairly stable 
disclosure level over the time period. Investing in firms which reduce the quantity of 
disclosed information gives the poorest return over the time period. Figure 5 shows the 
trends in the value-weighted portfolio returns. 
Figure 5: Value-weighted returns of change portfolios  
 
Figure 6 shows the equal-weighted portfolio returns. By investing NOK 1000 in 
Pos_Change at the beginning of 2008, the investment grows to NOK 1021.8 by the end of 
November 2011. This constitutes a return of 2.2 per cent over the 4-year period, and an 
annualized return of 0.44 per cent.  For No_Change, the 4-year investment yields a return of 
– 13 .5 per cent, or an annualized return of 2.7 per cent.  An investment in Neg_Change 
gives a 4-year return of – 13.06 per cent, and an annualized return of – 2.61 per cent.  
Figure 6: Equal-weighted returns of change portfolios 
 
The portfolio growth patterns follow the same trend for both value-weighted and equal-
weighted returns. Firms with improved disclosure score yield the highest returns and firms 
with aggravated disclosure yield the poorest returns.  
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5.5 Factor model regressions 
In this section, we examine our sub-hypothesis H_II by regressing stock returns on voluntary 
environmental disclosure characteristics. In the previous section, we examined the 
differences in portfolios returns. The results revealed a disparity in the returns, both when 
constructing portfolios based on disclosure level and on disclosure change. As proposed in 
section 4.3.2, one explanation for these observed disparities can be that the performance 
differences are driven by differences in firm characteristics of the portfolios. To examine 
this, we apply the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) and the four-factor model 
of Carhart (1997). When comparing our constructed Nordic factors to the European factors, 
we found the Nordic momentum factor to behave differently than expected. To account for 
this, we use both models in the analysis. The dependent variable     in the regression is 
monthly excess portfolio returns or monthly return differences between the extreme 
portfolios in each set of portfolios. 
5.5.1 Disclosure level and stock returns 
First, we examine the relationship between the absolute level of environmental disclosure 
and stock returns. 
5.5.1.1 Three-factor model for disclosure level 
The results of the three-factor model on both value-weighted and equal-weighted returns are 
listed in Table 20. With value-weighted returns, we find that the Midrange portfolio 
preforms better than both the High and Low portfolios. None of the extreme portfolios have 
significant alpha coefficients, but Midrange has a significant intercept at a 10 per cent 
significance level. Midrange has the highest alpha of 0.36, while both High and Low have 
negative alphas, of -0.03 and -0.43 respectively. The return difference High-Low has an 
insignificant alpha of 0.40. This alpha is the abnormal return on a zero-investment strategy 
that buys the High portfolio and sells short the Low portfolio. 
When applying the three-factor model on the equal-weighted portfolio returns, High has a 
significant alpha of -0.48 at a 10 per cent level. Midrange has an insignificant alpha value of 
-0.17, and Low has an alpha of -0.49, which is significant at a 10 per cent significance level. 
All portfolio alphas are negative when weighing the returns equally, with Midrange having 
the least negative alpha, and Low having the most negative value. The return difference 
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between the two extreme portfolios has an insignificant alpha value of 0.01 with equal-
weighted returns.  
Table 20: Three-factor model of disclosure level portfolios 
Value-weighted returns 
 α RMRF SMB HML R2 
High 
-0.03 
(0.21) 
1.02*** 
(0.05) 
-0.14** 
(0.06) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
0.93 
Midrange 
0.36* 
(0.21) 
1.02*** 
(0.06) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
0.07 
(0.07) 
0.94 
Low 
-0.43 
(0.36) 
1.05*** 
(0.10) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
0.08 
(0.10) 
0.89 
High-Low 
0.40 
(0.45) 
-0.04 
(0.13) 
-0.15 
(0.14) 
-0.09 
(0.13) 
0.08 
Equal-weighted returns 
 α RMRF SMB HML R2 
High 
-0.48* 
(0.25) 
0.96*** 
(0.07) 
0.09 
(0.09) 
0.22*** 
(0.07) 
0.93 
Midrange 
-0.17 
(0.22) 
0.93*** 
(0.06) 
0.24*** 
(0.07) 
0.24*** 
(0.07) 
0.95 
Low 
-0.49* 
(0.25) 
1.11*** 
(0.07) 
0.20** 
(0.08) 
0.36*** 
(0.07) 
0.94 
High-Low 
0.01 
(0.33) 
-0.15 
(0.10) 
-0.11 
(0.12) 
-0.14 
(0.10) 
0.28 
The level portfolios are described in section 5.2.1. The last row contains the results when we use the portfolio that buys the High portfolio 
and sells short the Low portfolio. The portfolios are reset at each year-end, according to new disclosure data. The independent variables are 
RMRF, SMB and HML. These variables are constructed to capture market, size and book-to-market effects, see section 4.4.6. Standard 
errors are reported in parenthesis. All variables are described in section 4.4.5. Significance at a 10, 5 and 1 per cent level is indicated as *, 
** and *** respectively. We use the White correction to deal with potential heteroscedasticity. 
 
5.5.1.2 Four-factor model for disclosure level 
Table 21 shows the regression output from applying the four-factor model on value-weighted 
returns and equal-weighted level portfolio returns. The Midrange portfolio has a significant 
alpha of 0.39 at a 10 per cent significance level. Both High and Low have insignificant and 
negative alphas of -0.06 and -0.41 respectively.  The High-Low return difference has an 
insignificant, but positive alpha of 0.35. These findings are consistent with the results of the 
three-factor model. 
With equal-weighted returns, the High portfolio has an alpha of -0.52 and Low has an alpha 
of -0.54, both significant at a 5 per cent significance level. The Midrange alpha is 
insignificant at -0.18. The return difference High-Low has a positive, but insignificant alpha 
of 0.02. 
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Table 21: Four-factor model of disclosure level portfolios 
Value-weighted returns 
 α RMRF SMB HML MOM R2 
High 
-0.06 
(0.22) 
1.02*** 
(0.07) 
-0.17* 
(0.09) 
-0.03 
(0.09) 
0.04 
(0.07) 
0.93 
Midrange 
0.39* 
(0.23) 
1.01*** 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
0.10 
(0.09) 
-0.04 
(0.08) 
0.94 
Low 
-0.41 
(0.32) 
1.05*** 
(0.10) 
0.02 
(0.11) 
0.09 
(0.09) 
-0.02 
(0.32) 
0.89 
High-Low 
0.35 
(0.42) 
-0.03 
(0.13) 
-0.19 
(0.16) 
-0.12 
(0.14) 
0.06 
(0.13) 
0.09 
Equal-weighted returns 
 α RMRF SMB HML MOM R2 
High 
-0.52** 
(0.24) 
0.96*** 
(0.07) 
0.05 
(0.11) 
0.19*** 
(0.06) 
0.05 
(0.08) 
0.93 
 
Midrange 
-0.18 
(0.20) 
0.93*** 
(0.06) 
0.24*** 
(0.08) 
0.24*** 
(0.07) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
0.95 
Low 
-0.54** 
(0.25) 
1.11*** 
(0.07) 
0.16 
(0.11) 
0.32*** 
(0.09) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
0.94 
High-Low 
0.02 
(0.34) 
-0.15 
(0.10) 
-0.10 
(0.16) 
-0.13 
(0.11) 
-0.01 
(0.12) 
0.28 
The level portfolios are described in section 5.2.1. The last row contains the results when we use the portfolio that buys the High portfolio 
and sells short the Low portfolio. The portfolios are reset at each year-end, according to new disclosure data. The independent variables are 
RMRF, SMB, HML, and Momentum. These variables are constructed to capture market, size, book-to-market, and momentum effects, see 
section 4.4.6. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. All variables are described in section 4.4.5. Significance at a 10, 5 and 1 per cent 
level is indicated as *, ** and *** respectively. We use the White correction to deal with potential heteroscedasticity. 
 
5.5.1.3 Summary of findings  
The results of both the three-factor and four-factor model show that the Midrange portfolio 
has the highest alpha value, and outperforms the two extreme portfolios. High performs 
better that Low, but the results are not statistically significant. Overall, we find little evidence 
of disclosure level having a significant effect on stock returns. 
5.5.2 Disclosure change and stock returns 
To test the impact of change in disclosure level, we repeat the same tests as in 5.5.1 on the 
portfolios constructed to capture disclosure change effects.  
5.5.2.1 Three-factor model for disclosure change 
The regression output from the three-factor model on value-weighted and equal-weighted 
portfolio returns are listed in Table 22. With value-weighted returns for the change 
portfolios, we find that the Pos_Change portfolio outperforms the two other portfolios with a 
significant alpha of 0.55. Neg_Change has a negative alpha of 0.6 within a 5 per cent 
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significance level. We find a slight negative alpha for the No_Change portfolio of 0.04, but 
this coefficient is not significant. When comparing the returns of Pos_Change to the returns 
of Neg_Change, we find a significant alpha of 1.16 at a 5 per cent significance level. This 
indicates that very little of the differences in raw returns can be attributes to differences in 
style between the two extreme portfolios. An investment strategy based of investing in the 
Pos_Change portfolio and going short in the Neg_Change portfolio yields a monthly 
abnormal excess return of 1.16 per cent, or about 13.9 per cent annually.  
When applying the same model on the equal-weighted returns we find no significant alphas. 
However, the alpha coefficient has the highest value for Pos_Change at - 0.08, and the 
lowest value for Neg_Change at -0.43. This indicates that the Pos_Change portfolio yields a 
higher abnormal return than the Neg_Change portfolio, although the results are not 
statistically significant. The return difference between the two extreme portfolios gives a 
positive, but insignificant alpha of 0.36. Hence, we observe the same trends for the equal 
weighted returns as observed for value-weighted returns, but with less statistical 
significance. 
Table 22: Three-factor model with disclosure change portfolios 
Value-weighted returns 
 α RMRF SMB HML R2 
Pos_Change 
0.55* 
(0.29) 
1.03*** 
(0.06) 
-0.11** 
(0.06) 
0.22*** 
(0.07) 
0.93 
No_Change 
-0.04 
(0.33) 
0.96*** 
(0.07) 
0.00 
(0.09) 
0.14* 
(0.07) 
0.91 
Neg_Change 
-0.60** 
(0.28) 
1.02*** 
(0.06) 
-0.11 
(0.07) 
-0.25*** 
(0.06) 
0.92 
Pos_Change-Neg_Change 
1.16** 
(0.51) 
0.01 
(0.11) 
-0.01 
(0.10) 
0.47*** 
(0.13) 
0.26 
Equal-weighted returns 
 α RMRF SMB HML R2 
Pos_Change 
-0.08 
(0.29) 
1.00*** 
(0.06) 
0.07 
(0.09) 
0.34*** 
(0.07) 
0.94 
No_Change 
-0.45 
(0.39) 
0.79*** 
(0.08) 
0.29*** 
(0.10) 
0.29*** 
(0.10) 
0.89 
Neg_Change 
-0.43 
(0.27) 
1.11*** 
(0.07) 
0.03 
(0.08) 
0.32*** 
(0.08) 
0.95 
Pos_Change-Neg_Change 
0.36 
(0.27) 
-0.11* 
(0.07) 
0.04 
(0.07) 
0.02 
(0.08) 
0.10 
The change portfolios are described in section 5.2.2. The last row contains the results when we use the portfolio that buys the Pos_Change 
portfolio and sells short the Neg_Change portfolio. The portfolios are reset at each year-end, according to new disclosure data. The 
independent variables are RMRF, SMB and HML. These variables are constructed to capture market, size and book-to-market effects, see 
section 4.4.6.. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. All variables are described in section 4.4.5. Significance at a 10, 5 and 1 per cent 
level is indicated as *, ** and *** respectively. We use the White correction to deal with potential heteroscedasticity. 
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5.5.2.2 Four-factor model for disclosure change 
We add the momentum factor and test the four-factor model on disclosure change portfolio 
returns. Table 23 shows the output from the regression analysis. For value-weighted returns, 
we find that Pos_Change yields the highest alpha at 0.36. The No_Change portfolio has the 
second best alpha at -0.21, and the Neg_Change portfolio has the lowest alpha value of  
-0.36. None of the alphas has statistical significance. The difference in returns of 
Pos_Change and Neg_Change yields an alpha of 0.72. This alpha is not statistically 
significant, but it indicates that it could be profitable to invest in the positive change 
portfolio and sell short the negative change portfolio.  
With equal-weighted returns for the three portfolios, we find the same trend as described for 
value-weighted returns. Pos_Change has the highest value of alpha with negative 0.23, and 
Neg_Change has the lowest value of alpha with -0.57. The No_Change portfolio is in 
between with an alpha of -0.46. Only the alpha for Neg_Change shows statistical 
significance. The alpha for the return difference between the extreme portfolios is not 
significant, but the result supports previous findings. 
Table 23: Four-factor model with disclosure change portfolios 
Value-weighted returns 
 α RMRF SMB HML MOM R2 
Pos_Change 
0.36 
(0.28) 
1.03*** 
(0.06) 
-0.23*** 
(0.08) 
0.12* 
(0.07) 
0.17* 
(0.08) 
0.94 
No_Change 
-0.21 
(0.34) 
0.96*** 
(0.07) 
-0.10 
(0.09) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
0.15 
(0.09) 
0.91 
Neg_Change 
-0.36 
(0.26) 
1.02*** 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.13** 
(0.06) 
-0.20*** 
(0.07) 
0.93 
Pos_Change-Neg_Change 
0.72 
(0.45) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
-0.25** 
(0.12) 
0.25** 
(0.11) 
0.36** 
(0.14) 
0.37 
Equal-weighted returns 
 α RMRF SMB HML MOM R2 
Pos_Change 
-0.23 
(0.28) 
1.00*** 
(0.06) 
-0.01 
(0.11) 
0.26*** 
(0.09) 
0.12 
(0.09) 
0.94 
No_Change 
-0.46 
(0.39) 
0.79*** 
(0.08) 
0.29** 
(0.13) 
0.29** 
(0.12) 
0.00 
(0.11) 
0.89 
Neg_Change 
-0.57** 
(0.25) 
1.11*** 
(0.07) 
-0.04 
(0.10) 
0.25*** 
(0.09) 
0.11 
(0.09) 
0.95 
Pos_Change-Neg_Change 
0.34 
(0.34) 
-0.11* 
(0.07) 
0.03 
(0.10) 
0.02 
(0.11) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
0.10 
The change portfolios are described in section 5.2.2. The last row contains the results when we use the portfolio that buys the Pos_Change 
portfolio and sells short the Neg_Change portfolio. The portfolios are reset at each year-end, according to new disclosure data. The 
independent variables are RMRF, SMB, HML, and MOM, see section 4.4.6. Significance  at 10, 5 and 1 per cent are indicated as *, ** and 
*** respectively. Standard errors reported in parenthesis. All variables are described in section 4.4.5. We use the White correction to deal 
with potential heteroscedasticity. 
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5.5.2.3 Summary of findings 
When we test the performance attribution model on change portfolios, the results from both 
factor models indicate the same relations. Pos_Change outperforms the two extreme 
portfolios, and No_Change performs better than Neg_Change. However, we are not able to 
document significant relations in all the tests, and value-weighted returns yield more 
significant results than equal-weighted returns.  Overall, the findings suggest that there is a 
positive association between an improvement in disclosure level and abnormal excess 
returns. An investment strategy of going long in the Pos_Change portfolio and selling short 
in the Neg_Change portfolio yields a positive abnormal excess return.  
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6. Results and discussions 
6.1 Environmental disclosure and firm value 
Our main null hypothesis H aims to determine whether firms receive value benefits from 
voluntary environmental disclosure. If firms experience an increase in firm value as a 
consequence of disclosure, they would have an economic incentive to initiate environmental 
disclosure voluntarily. The logic behind this argument is similar to the one presented by 
Telle (2006) and Orlitzky et al. (2003) about the incentive effect of a positive association 
between CSR performance and economic performance. Such an incentive might have 
implications for investors, managers and governments. 
We do a preliminary test of the value effect of disclosure initiatives, and test the Nordic 
sample against the Disclosure sample. We find that firms participating in voluntary 
environmental disclosure have a significantly higher Tobin’s Q than non-disclosing firms in 
the Nordic sample. This indicates that the initiative to disclose environmental information is 
perceived positively, and leads to an increase in firm value.  
The results are contradictory when modeling for operating performance measures as proxy 
for firm value. The disclosure initiative has a significantly negative relationship with return 
on equity and return on assets. Literature suggests that discretionary disclosure can be costly 
(Verrecchia 1983), and our findings suggest that the added cost of disclosure is better 
reflected in proxies based on operating performance rather than financial performance. The 
results from the preliminary test are potentially biased due to the problem of endogeneity. 
The decision to disclose is voluntary, and there is a possibility that only firms that benefit 
from disclosure have chosen to do so. In that case, the impact of disclosure is magnified and 
the results are biased.  
Next, we investigate the impact of environmental disclosure characteristics within the firms 
who have chosen to disclose environmental information. Our null hypothesis H_I predicts 
that voluntary environmental disclosure has no association with firm value. First, we look at 
the effect of absolute disclosure level. We find a positive association between Tobin’s Q and 
the level of environmental disclosure which allows us to reject the null hypothesis. This 
result holds when adjusting Tobin’s Q for industry and when applying different disclosure 
level variables, and is consistent under both OLS and FE regression. These findings are in 
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line with the positive associations between disclosure and firm value found by Plumlee et al. 
(2010) and Clarkson et al. (2010). 
Our findings are not conclusive when modeling with operational performance measures as 
proxies for firm value, and thus, we are unable to draw a conclusion about how level of 
disclosure is reflected in those measures. With pooled OLS we find indications of a positive 
effect of disclosure level, but under FE we find indications of an opposite effect. The R
2
s for 
these models are very low and suggest that the independent variables predict little of the 
variation in the dependent variable. This could imply that the variable is difficult to predict, 
or there are omitted variables in the regression. In the second scenario, the results could be 
biased.  
Next, we examine the effects of changes in a firm’s environmental score. We want to test 
whether evidence of improvement in a firm’s quality or quantity of environmental reporting 
is valued. When modeling with financial performance measures as dependent variable, we 
find no significant effects. Neither for Tobin’s Q nor industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q do we find 
evidence of impacts of change in disclosure score. Regressions with operating measures as 
proxy for firm value indicate a negative association between disclosure and firm value. 
These results are consistent under both OLS and FE assumptions. The results are conflicting 
when modeling with different firm value proxies. This might be explained by the nature of 
the performance measures. The operating performance measures reflect short term 
performance, while Tobin’s Q reflects growth opportunities and long-term performance. One 
possible interpretation of the negative impact on short-term value is that disclosure costs are 
accounted for in the short term, while benefits from environmental activities are assumed to 
be of longer term. A reason why we observe this disparity when analyzing the effects of 
change and not when analyzing for level can be implementation costs. Expanding the scope 
of environmental reporting might lead to increased disclosure costs, while maintaining a 
stable level of disclosure does not require the same resources.  
6.2 Environmental disclosure and stock returns 
Next, we investigate the relationship between environmental disclosure and stock returns. 
The null hypothesis H_II predicts no association between voluntary environmental 
disclosure and stock returns. 
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First, we investigate the association between the level of environmental disclosure and stock 
returns. We find that firms in the Midrange portfolio outperform the two extreme portfolios. 
Discretionary disclosure theory predicts that it will be favorable to disclose information up to 
a threshold (Verrecchia 1983). Disclosure above this threshold are either bad news that will 
lead to a negative market reaction or yield a net loss since disclosure costs exceeds benefits 
received. Orlitzky and Whelan (2007) argue that the level of disclosure is set at the 
equilibrium between marginal disclosure costs and marginal disclosure benefits. This might 
explain why the Midrange portfolio outperforms to the two other portfolios. Firms in the 
High portfolio experience a negative market reaction due to disclosure above threshold level. 
The negative market reaction can be caused by the revelation of bad news or increased 
disclosure costs. Firms in the Low portfolio experience a negative market reaction due to 
investors perceiving the lack of disclosure as a sign of bad news. This interpretation is in line 
with the “good news” theory of Verrecchia (1983).  
Next, we examine the effects of changes in a firm’s environmental score on stock returns. 
We find that firms with increased environmental disclosure yield a higher return than firms 
with decreased environmental disclosure. This is in line with Healy et al. (1999) who find 
evidence that increased voluntary firm disclosure is linked to improved stock performance. 
An explanation of this finding might be an increased investor base due to improved 
awareness of the firm (Merton 1987). The attraction of investors with preferences for 
responsible investments is another possible explanation. Assuming efficient markets, the 
positive association indicates that the market appreciates the new disclosed information as 
positive and value relevant, and adjusts the stock price to a fair, higher level.  
The efficient market hypothesis predicts that the market will react to and incorporate new 
information into the valuation of stocks. We find that firms with an improved disclosure 
level yield a higher rate of return compared to the rest of the sample firms. This suggests that 
changes in disclosure level represent new information to the market, and that the market 
adjusts slowly as a consequence of improved or decreased disclosure. We do not find the 
same market reaction to absolute level of disclosure. This can be interpreted as if the level of 
disclosure represents known information to investors and that disclosure level already is 
incorporated in the stock price. 
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6.3 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
Some limitations of our study are worth mentioning. The field of voluntary social and 
environmental disclosure research is fairly new, and the models that have been applied in 
these studies are not as validated as models on financial disclosure. Environmental 
disclosure might be affected by other variables than suggested by traditional, discretionary 
disclosure literature. As a consequence, the regression results might be biased due to omitted 
variables like management, technology and research and development.  
We document findings that support the prediction of voluntary environmental disclosure to 
have an effect on firm value. The results however, do not suggest the causality of the 
relationship. It gives an indication that environmental disclosure is associated with higher 
firm value, but we do not document that the firms have so because they disclose their 
environmental performance.  
Our study consists of firms from four different countries. We do not control for differences 
between the countries, and treat the sample as homogeneous. However, there are differences 
in government regulations in the Nordic countries. This and other country-specific factors 
might affect the disclosure decisions of firms. In addition, a further examination of 
disclosure differences between industries than we provide might give improved insight.  
We tried, but were unable to find sufficient data on environmental performance matching our 
sample. Initially, we wanted to investigate the relation between environmental disclosure, 
environmental performance and firm value. According to “good news” theory, one could 
predict that only firms with favorable information and high environmental performance 
would choose to disclose. The fact that we could not find suitable data to test this is a 
limitation in our study. 
Overcoming the limitations of our study could be of interest for future research on the topic.  
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7. Conclusion 
This paper empirically investigates the relationship between voluntary environmental 
disclosure and firm value.  The analysis is based on a sample consisting of Nordic listed 
firms disclosing to the Carbon Disclosure Project in the period of 2007 to 2011.  
Using pooled OLS regression, we find a positive relation between voluntary environmental 
disclosure and firm value, measured as Tobin’s Q. The results suggest that firms with higher 
environmental disclosure level have higher value than firms with lower level of 
environmental disclosure. This finding indicates that environmental disclosure is value 
relevant. When controlling for fixed effects in the estimation, we find a similar impact. We 
employ the factor models of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) to analyze the 
impact of environmental disclosure on the market valuation of a firm, given by stock returns. 
We find that the level of environmental disclosure seems to be known information to the 
market, while changes in disclosure from one year to the next is perceived as new 
information. This causes a positive market reaction and we find evidence of a positive 
relation between disclosure improvement and stock returns. This is the opposite of the 
negative market reaction documented by Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn (2011), but in 
accordance with findings of a positive relation between non-financial disclosure and firm 
value presented by Plumlee et al. (2010) and Clarkson et al. (2010). 
Overall, our findings document a positive relation between voluntary environmental 
disclosure and firm value. The impact of disclosure has potential consequences for firms, 
investors and government.  For firms and managers, the positive association on firm value is 
value relevant in their disclosure decisions. Our findings suggest a possible negative, short-
term effect of disclosure on firm profitability, but document a positive effect on Tobin’s Q, 
which reflect firm value on a longer-term basis. Disclosure can be interpreted as having a 
negative short-term effect due to disclosure costs, but yielding long-term benefits. Potential 
benefits are product differentiation, increased firm awareness and lower transaction costs. 
For investors, increased disclosure might lead to decreased information asymmetry, and 
greater knowledge of ethical dimensions of the firm. For governments, a positive relation 
between environmental disclosure and firm value indicate that firms will have an incentive 
to disclose their environmental performance voluntarily. If so, the need for government 
regulation on social and environmental accounting will be less extensive.  
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Appendix 1: List of CDP Nordic Scores 
 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
A.P. MOELLER - MAERSK A/S  
 
67 66 73 
AF AB  
   
73 
AHLSTROM (A) OY 
 
45 61 55 57 
AKER ASA 9 23 
   ALFA LAVAL AB 41 54 56 47 
 ALM. BRAND  25 12 
  ALMA MEDIA OYJ  42 26 63 78 
AMER SPORTS CORP  
   
51 
ARENDALS FOSSEKOMPANI ASA  
  
9 
 ASSA ABLOY AB 41 44 42 34 41 
ATEA ASA 
  
63 69 84 
ATLAS COPCO AB 45 47 67 60 72 
ATRIUM LJUNGBERG 
  
61 60 68 
AURIGA INDUSTRIES A/S 
  
50 
 
22 
AXFOOD AB 
 
43 45 70 51 
BANG & OLUFSEN AS 
 
37 48 46 49 
BOCONCEPT HOLDING 
   
66 
 BOLIDEN AB 50 38 44 
 
78 
CARGOTEC CORP 
 
32 57 60 52 
CARLSBERG A/S 53 76 71 68 59 
CASTELLUM 45 66 43 30 49 
CERMAQ ASA 
   
63 75 
CLAS OHLSON AB 
 
81 58 61 67 
COLOPLAST A/S 68 49 66 66 65 
DAMPSKIBSSELSKABET NORDEN AS 
 
49 54 79 82 
DANSKE BANK 55 57 63 66 66 
DE SAMMENSLUTTEDE VOGNMAEND 
 
30 30 38 56 
DFDS AS 
  
44 
  DNB ASA 32 39 62 59 63 
DNO INTERNATIONAL ASA 
 
30 44 42 69 
DOF ASA 
    
60 
EKORNES ASA 
    
80 
ELECTROLUX AB 27 70 76 74 86 
ELEKTA AB 
  
61 62 76 
ELISA CORP 
    
70 
ELTEK ASA 
    
27 
ENIRO AB 14 74 45 43 
 ERICSSON 82 88 63 72 82 
FABEGE 59 83 50 54 
 FINNAIR OY 34 34 61 61 78 
FLSMIDTH & CO AS 
   
61 54 
FORTUM OYJ 100 74 79 82 97 
GENMAB AS 
 
14 30 24 12 
GETINGE AB 68 44 48 60 63 
GN STORE NORD A/S 
  
5 
  H LUNDBECK A/S 59 49 
 
80 79 
HAFSLUND ASA 
  
70 71 47 
HENNES & MAURITZ AB 41 85 58 52 57 
HEXAGON AB 5 
    HEXPOL AB 
    
46 
HOLMEN AB 75 54 66 60 64 
HUFVUDSTADEN 41 58 41 89 88 
HUHTAMAKI OYJ 56 60 42 40 31 
HUSQVARNA AB 
 
55 39 60 40 
INDUSTRIVERDEN 0 20 7 
 
41 
INTRUM JUSTITIA AB 
 
36 22 
  INVESTMENTS AB KINNEVIK 59 78 40 52 56 
INVESTOR 
 
68 64 59 73 
JM AB 
  
65 67 66 
KEMIRA OY 16 37 42 38 30 
KESKO OYJ 73 85 71 73 80 
KONECRANES PLC 18 
 
33 71 52 
KONGSBERG GRUPPEN ASA 
    
50 
KUNGSLEDEN 
 
32 67 68 68 
LASSILA & TIKANOJA GROUP 
 
40 54 
 
57 
LATOUR INVESTMENT AB 
 
22 22 
  LEMMINKAINEN OYJ 
    
69 
LINDAB INTL AB 
 
38 58 62 70 
LUNDIN PETROLEUM AB 
 
51 76 83 74 
     
 71 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
MARINE HARVEST ASA 50 
   
74 
MEDA AB 
 
41 70 63 61 
MELKER SCHÖRLING 
 
40 
  
6 
METSO OYJ 64 52 64 61 41 
MTG-MODERN TIMES GROUP AB 
  
43 62 70 
NCC AB 50 22 66 59 55 
NESTE OIL OYJ 69 53 64 64 58 
NKT HOLDING A/S 
 
37 63 54 63 
NOBIA AB 68 78 58 46 51 
NOKIAN TYRES PLC 
  
23 32 
 NORDEA BANK 
 
50 58 50 87 
NORDNET 
    
49 
NORSK HYDRO ASA 84 54 61 59 56 
NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER A/S 
 
56 84 83 87 
NOVO NORDISK A/S 66 56 73 89 89 
NOVOZYMES A/S 72 54 70 77 85 
ODFJELL SE 
    
65 
OP BANK GROUP 32 43 24 34 
 ORION CORP 44 30 41 58 65 
ORKLA ASA 
 
62 68 71 75 
OUTOKUMPU OY 72 61 51 86 84 
OUTOTEC OYJ 
  
74 90 81 
PA RESOURCES AB 
   
13 
 PEAB AB 
  
26 20 71 
PGS-PETROLEUM GEO-SERVICES 25 32 70 71 68 
POYRY PLC 
   
8 
 PRONOVA BIOPHARMA ASA 
  
70 69 
 RATOS 23 31 12 18 12 
RAUTARUUKKI OY 
 
56 69 61 63 
RENEWABLE ENERGY CORP AS 32 21 
   ROCKWOOL INTERNATIONAL A/S 
  
68 78 86 
ROYAL UNIBREW 
  
34 
  SAAB AB 75 57 75 81 81 
SALMAR ASA 
  
54 84 85 
SANDVIK AB 41 40 73 63 54 
SANOMA CORP 59 39 27 24 43 
SAS AB 34 33 37 25 74 
SCANIA AB 63 12 76 74 59 
SCA-SVENSKA CELLULOSA AB 56 57 63 90 86 
SCHIBSTED ASA 0 
  
57 73 
SEB 50 22 67 82 81 
SECURITAS AB 
    
71 
SKANSKA AB 9 40 67 85 83 
SKF AB 69 62 69 71 80 
SOLAR AS 
    
54 
SOLSTAD OFFSHORE 
    
75 
SPONDA PIC 
 
20 
   SSAB CORP 
 
65 72 78 77 
STATOIL ASA 94 57 40 39 60 
STOCKMANN AB 50 21 12 
 
1 
STOREBRAND ASA 36 63 72 77 84 
SVENSKA HANDELSBANKEN 32 36 11 36 76 
SWEDBANK 32 61 42 67 72 
SWEDISH MATCH AB 59 55 59 45 60 
TALVIVAARA MINING CO LTD 
   
60 56 
TDC A/S 19 79 69 75 59 
TELE2 AB 0 
 
54 70 73 
TELENOR ASA 68 84 65 63 72 
TELIASONERA AB 86 89 71 80 72 
TIETO CORP 36 
 
25 65 96 
TOMRA SYSTEMS A/S 59 63 55 64 74 
TOPDANMARK 
  
56 62 69 
TORM AS 
 
41 73 77 73 
TRELLEBORG AB 75 53 63 69 65 
TRYG/TRYG VESTA 23 81 69 75 80 
UPM-KYMMENE CORP 31 49 72 90 83 
UPONOR OYJ 
   
60 65 
VAISALA OYJ 
   
67 65 
VEIDEKKE A/S 
 
49 68 50 60 
VESTAS WIND SYSTEMS A/S 50 51 77 82 72 
VOLVO AB 63 42 60 57 56 
WALLENSTAM 
   
27 66 
WIHLBORGS FASTIGHETER 
   
33 61 
WILLIAM DEMANT 
  
70 70 61 
YARA INTERNATIONAL ASA 50 
  
38 
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Appendix 2: Outlying observations 
 
An outlying observation is unusual in size and can have several explanations. According to 
Woolridge (2009) it can be explained by one of three reasons; an error in the recording of the 
value, the observation should not have been included in the sample or the observation is 
correctly recorded and is unusually large or small, and a valid observation. However, if the 
outlier is explained by reason one or two, the observation should be removed from the 
sample.  We use a scatterplot of Tobin’s Q against environmental disclosure score to identify 
outliers in the disclosure sample.   
Figure 7: Scatterplot of Tobin’s Q against environmental disclosure score 
 
The observations of Tobin’s Q range from 0.548 to 8.191. Figure 7 shows that the majority 
of observations are grouped between the minimum and four. 21 observations have a Tobin’s 
Q above four, a total of eight firms. The Nordic capital markets are relatively small, but have 
some major international companies listed. This implies that some firms are very large, but 
the majority of the listed firms are small. This can explain the outlying observations, and we 
have no reason to suspect the outlying observations to be invalid. We choose not to remove 
the outliers in our analysis.  
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Appendix 3: List of sustainability websites 
 Discloure Sample  Sustainability/ responsibility website  
A.P. MOELLER - MAERSK A/S http://www.maersk.com/Sustainability/Pages/Welcome.aspx  
AF AB http://www.afconsult.com/no/Barekraftige-losninger/  
AHLSTROM (A) OY http://www.ahlstrom.com/en/sustainability/Pages/default.aspx  
AKER ASA http://www.akerasa.com/section.cfm?path=377,493  
ALFA LAVAL AB http://www.alfalaval.com/about-us/sustainability/pages/sustainability.aspx  
ALM. BRAND http://www.almbrand.dk/abdk/OmAlmBrand/Investor/CSRiAlmBrand/index.htm  
ALMA MEDIA OYJ http://www.almamedia.fi/environment_1  
AMER SPORTS CORP http://www.amersports.com/about/social_responsibility/environmental_actions/  
ARENDALS FOSSEKOMPANI ASA http://www.arendalsfoss.no/index.php?show=20&expand=18,20  
ASSA ABLOY AB http://www.assaabloy.com/en/com/Sustainability/  
ATEA ASA http://www.atea.no/miljopolitikk  
ATLAS COPCO AB http://www.atlascopco.com/corporateresponsibility/  
ATRIUM LJUNGBERG http://www.atriumljungberg.se/Omoss/Ansvarsfullt-foretagande1/  
AURIGA INDUSTRIES A/S http://www.auriga-industries.com/en/auriga_industries/csr/  
AXFOOD AB http://www.axfood.se/sv/Hallbarhet/  
BANG & OLUFSEN AS http://www.bang-olufsen.com/en/the-company/heritage/enviroment  
BOCONCEPT HOLDING http://www.boconceptholding.dk/  
BOLIDEN AB http://www.boliden.com/Sustainability/Environmental-responsibility/  
CARGOTEC CORP http://www.cargotec.com/en-global/about-us/sustainability/Pages/default.aspx  
CARLSBERG A/S http://www.carlsbergdanmark.dk/omos/CSR/Miljoe/Pages/default.aspx  
CASTELLUM http://www.castellum.se/om-castellum/ansvarsfullt-foeretagande.html  
CERMAQ ASA http://www.cermaq.com/portal/wps/wcm/connect/cermaqno/home/sustainability/  
CLAS OHLSON AB http://om.clasohlson.com/foretaget/Hallbar-utveckling/Miljo/  
COLOPLAST A/S http://www.coloplast.no/coloplastnorge/om%20coloplast/ansvar/responsibilityfortheenvironment  
DAMPSKIBSSELSKABET NORDEN AS http://www.ds-norden.com/profile/csr/systematicapproach/  
DANSKE BANK http://danskebank.dk/da-dk/Om-banken/Samfundsengagement/Pages/Miljoe.aspx  
DE SAMMENSLUTTEDE VOGNMAEND http://www.dsv.com/AboutUs/CorporateSocialResponsibility/ Environment  
DFDS AS http://www.dfdsgroup.com/About/Responsibility/  
DNB ASA https://www.dnb.no/om-oss/samfunnsansvar.html  
DNO INTERNATIONAL ASA http://www.dno.no/responsibility/qhse/environment/  
DOF ASA http://www.dof.no/QHSE-92.aspx  
EKORNES ASA http://www.ekornes.no/om-ekornes/miljo-og-samfunnsansvar  
ELECTROLUX AB http://group.electrolux.com/en/category/sustainability/  
ELEKTA AB http://www.elekta.com/company/sustainability/the-environment.html  
ELISA CORP http://www.elisa.com/on-elisa/corporate/corporate-responsibility/environmental-responsibility/  
ELTEK ASA http://www.eltek.com/wip4/detail_ir.epl?cat=28989  
ENIRO AB http://www.eniro.com/en/About-Eniro/Corporate-responsibility/  
ERICSSON http://www.ericsson.com/thecompany/sustainability_corporateresponsibility  
FABEGE http://www.fabege.se/en/Corporate-Governance/Corporate-responsibility-/  
FINNAIR OY http://www.finnair.com/NO/NO/responsibility  
FLSMIDTH & CO AS http://www.flsmidth.com/en-US/Investor+Relations/Governance  
FORTUM OYJ http://www.fortum.com/en/sustainability/pages/default.aspx  
GENMAB AS http://ir.genmab.com/csr.cfm  
GETINGE AB http://www.getinge.com/about-us/sustainability/  
GN STORE NORD A/S http://www.gn.com/EN/GNAbout/Pages/CorporateSocialResponsibility.aspx  
H LUNDBECK A/S http://www.lundbeck.com/global/corporate-responsib  
HAFSLUND ASA http://www.hafslund.no/om-hafslund/artikler/les_artikkel.asp?artikkelid=2099  
HENNES & MAURITZ AB http://about.hm.com/content/hm/AboutSection/en/About/Sustainability.html#cm-menu  
HEXAGON AB http://www.hexagon.com/en/Corporate-Responsibility.htm  
HEXPOL AB http://www.hexpol.com/www/Hexpol.nsf/(Siteindex)/EnvironmentalandSocialResponsibility  
HOLMEN AB http://www.holmen.com/Sustainability/  
HUFVUDSTADEN http://hufvudstaden.se/en/About-Hufvudstaden /Quality-and-the-environment/  
HUHTAMAKI OYJ http://www2.huhtamaki.com/web/sustainability  
HUSQVARNA AB http://husqvarnagroup.com/en/corporate-responsibility  
INDUSTRIVERDEN http://www.industrivarden.net/About-us/Social-responsibility/  
INTRUM JUSTITIA AB http://www.intrum.com/About-Us/Our-role-in-society/  
INVESTMENTS AB KINNEVIK http://www.kinnevik.se/en/Corporate-Governance/Introduction/  
INVESTOR http://www.investorab.com/en/AboutInvestor/CSR/default.htm  
JM AB http://www.jm.se/Templates/TwoColumnPage.aspx?id=3153  
KEMIRA OY http://www.kemira.com/en/sustainability/pages/default.aspx  
KESKO OYJ http://www.kesko.fi/en/Responsibility/  
KONECRANES PLC http://www.konecranes.com/portal/eng/about_us/corporate_responsibility/  
KONGSBERG GRUPPEN ASA http://www.kongsberg.com/en/kog/aboutus/corporatesocialresponsibility/  
KUNGSLEDEN http://www.kungsleden.se/en/about-kungsleden/corporate-responsibility/  
LASSILA & TIKANOJA GROUP http://www.lassila-tikanoja.com/en/lassilatikanoja/corporate_responsibility/Pages/Default.aspx  
LEMMINKAINEN OYJ http://www.lemminkainen.com/Company/Responsibility/Environmental_responsibility  
LINDAB INTL AB http://www.lindab.com/global/pro/about-lindab/lindab-life/environment/Pages/default.aspx  
LUNDIN PETROLEUM AB http://www.lundin-petroleum.com/eng/corporate_responsibility.php  
MARINE HARVEST ASA http://marineharvest.com/en/CorporateResponsibility/  
MEDA AB http://www.meda.se/csr/  
MELKER SCHÖRLING http://www.melkerschorlingab.se/en/corporate-governance/csr  
METSO OYJ http://metso.com/corporation/sd_eng.nsf/WebWID/WTB-041115-2256F-42F2F?OpenDocument  
MTG-MODERN TIMES GROUP AB http://www.mtg.se/en/modern-responsibility/  
NCC AB http://www.ncc.no/no/OM-NCC/Miljo/  
NESTE OIL OYJ http://www.nesteoil.com/default.asp?path=1,41,12079  
NKT HOLDING A/S http://www.nkt.dk/uk/Menu/CSR  
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NOBIA AB http://www.nobia.com/About-Nobia/Running-sustainable-business/  
NOKIAN TYRES PLC http://www.nokiantyres.no/Miljo-og-sikkerhet  
NORDEA BANK http://www.nordea.com/Om+Nordea/Samfunnsansvar/56492.html  
NORDNET http://org.nordnet.se/en/about/about-nordnet/how-we-do-it/responsibility  
NORSK HYDRO ASA http://www.hydro.com/no/Var-framtid/Miljo/  
NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER A/S http://www.norskeskog.com/Responsibility.aspx  
NOVO NORDISK A/S http://www.novonordisk.com/sustainability/default.asp  
NOVOZYMES A/S http://www.novozymes.com/en/sustainability/Pages/default.aspx  
ODFJELL SE http://www.odfjell.com/AboutOdfjell/CorporateSocialResponsibility/Pages/default.aspx  
OP BANK GROUP https://www.op.fi/op/op-pohjola-gruppen/ansvarskansla?id=80400&srcpl=1&kielikoodi=sv  
ORION CORP http://www.orion.fi/en/Sustainability/  
ORKLA ASA http://www.orkla.no/Miljoe-og-samfunn/Miljoe  
OUTOKUMPU OY http://www.outokumpu.com/en/Sustainability/Pages/Sustainability.aspx  
OUTOTEC OYJ http://www.outotec.com/default____40847.aspx?epslanguage=EN  
PA RESOURCES AB http://www.paresources.se/en/Environment-safety-and-society/  
PEAB AB http://www.peab.com/About-Peab/Sustainability-report/  
PGS-PETROLEUM GEO-SERVICES http://www.pgs.com/en/About-us/Commitments/HSEQ/Environment/  
POYRY PLC http://www.poyry.com/about-poyry/corporate-responsibility  
PRONOVA BIOPHARMA ASA http://www.pronova.com/getfile.php/WEB/Janne/Filarkiv/Other/HealthSafetyandEnvironment.pdf  
RATOS http://www.ratos.se/Corporate-Responsibility/  
RAUTARUUKKI OY http://www.ratos.se/Corporate-Responsibility/  
RENEWABLE ENERGY CORP AS http://www.recgroup.com/en/sustainability/  
ROCKWOOL INTERNATIONAL A/S http://www.rockwool.com/environment  
ROYAL UNIBREW http://www.royalunibrew.com/Default.aspx?ID=1149  
SAAB AB http://www.saabgroup.com/en/About-Saab/Investor-relations/Saabs-responsibilities/  
SALMAR ASA http://www.salmar.no/About-SalMar/HSE  
SANDVIK AB http://www.sandvik.com/en/about-sandvik/sustainability/  
SANOMA CORP http://www.sanoma.com/corporate-responsibility  
SAS AB http://www.sasgroup.net/SASGroup/default.asp  
SCANIA AB http://www.scania.com/scania-group/sustainability/  
SCA-SVENSKA CELLULOSA AB http://www.sca.com/en/sustainability/  
SCHIBSTED ASA http://www.schibsted.com/our-social-responsibility/  
SEB http://www.seb.no/pow/wcp/sebgroup.asp?website=TAB7&lang=en  
SECURITAS AB http://www.securitas.com/en/Our-Responsibility/  
SKANSKA AB http://www.skanska.no/no/Om-Skanska/Samfunnsansvar/  
SKF AB http://www.skf.com/portal/skf/home/sustainability?contentId=004213&lang=en  
SOLAR AS http://www.solarnorge.no/Menu/Om+Solar/Milj%c3%b8  
SOLSTAD OFFSHORE http://www.solstad.no/greenoperations/  
SPONDA PIC http://www.sponda.fi/en/responsibility/spondability/Pages/default.aspx  
SSAB CORP http://www.ssab.com/en/Investor--Media/Sustainability/31/  
STATOIL ASA http://www.statoil.com/no/environmentsociety/pages/default.aspx  
STOCKMANN AB http://www.stockmanngroup.fi/en/responsibility  
STOREBRAND ASA http://www.storebrand.no/site/stb.nsf/Pages/baerekraftige-investeringer.html  
SVENSKA HANDELSBANKEN http://www.handelsbanken.com/ About_the_group/Investor_Relations/Corporate_Social_Responsibility  
SWEDBANK http://www.swedbank.com/corporate-sustainability/index.htm  
SWEDISH MATCH AB http://www.swedishmatch.com/en/Sustainability/Environment/  
TALVIVAARA MINING CO LTD http://www.talvivaara.com/Sustainability/environmental-responsibility  
TDC A/S http://tdc.com/publish.php?dogtag=com_profile_cr_climate  
TELE2 AB http://www.tele2.no/andre-engasjement.html  
TELENOR ASA http://www.telenor.no/om/samfunnsansvar/klimaogmiljo.jsp  
TELIASONERA AB http://www.teliasonera.com/en/corporate-responsibility/environment/  
TIETO CORP http://www.tieto.com/about-us/corporate-responsibility/environmental-responsibility  
TOMRA SYSTEMS A/S http://www.tomra.com/default.asp?V_ITEM_ID=18  
TOPDANMARK http://inv.dk.topdanmark.com/csr.cfm  
TORM AS http://csr.torm.com/environment-climate  
TRELLEBORG AB http://www.trelleborg.com/en/The-Group/Corporate-Responsibility/  
TRYG/TRYG VESTA http://www.tryg.no/om-tryg/samfunnsansvar/klima-og-miljoe/index.html  
UPM-KYMMENE CORP http://www.upm.com/EN/RESPONSIBILITY/Pages/default.aspx  
UPONOR OYJ http://www.uponor.no/about-uponor/uponor-as-a-partner/sustainability.aspx  
VAISALA OYJ http://www.vaisala.com/en/sustainability/Pages/default.aspx  
VEIDEKKE A/S http://www.veidekke.no/miljo-og-samfunn/  
VESTAS WIND SYSTEMS A/S http://www.vestas.com/en/about-vestas/sustainability.aspx  
VOLVO AB http://www.volvogroup.com/group/global/engb/responsibility/environmental_responsibility/Pages/default.aspx  
WALLENSTAM http://www.wallenstam.se/om/om-oss/miljo-samhallsansvar/  
WIHLBORGS FASTIGHETER http://wihlborgs.com/About-Wihlborgs/CSR-Sustainable-enterprise/  
WILLIAM DEMANT http://www.demant.com/csr.cfm  
YARA INTERNATIONAL ASA http://www.yara.com/sustainability/index.aspx  
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Appendix 4: Global Industry Classification Standard 
The Global Industry Classification Standard is developed by the MSCI and aim to enhance 
investor research and asset management for financial professionals (MSCI 2012). The GICS 
classifies companies based on their core business on four levels – sector, industry group, 
industries and sub-industries. The structure consists of 10 sectors, 24 industry groups, 68 
industries and 154 sub-industries (MSCI 2012). We choose use the annual two-digit sector 
codes to classify the firms in our population. The rationale behind not using a more detailed 
industry classification is the relatively small sample size and the desire to get a larger 
number of observations in each category. Table 24 show the sector distribution of our 
disclosure sample in 2011. The distribution is fairly stable over the period. 
Table 24: Global Industry Classification Standard 
Sector Code Sector name 
Percentage of disclosure sample 
(2011) 
10 Energy 6 % 
15 Materials 14 % 
20 Industrial 30 % 
25 Consumer Discretionary 11 % 
30 Consumer Staples 5 % 
35 Health Care 7 % 
40 Financials 17 % 
45 Information Technology 5 % 
50 Telecommunications Services 4 % 
55 Utilities 2% 
 
 
